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ARTICLES

LIBERTY: THE CONCEPT AND ITS
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
TIMOTHY

P. TERRELL*

In the heady higher legal atmosphere of constitutional
law, the concept of liberty remains enigmatic. While countless scholars have found within the language and structure of
the Constitution a range of fundamental political themes involving some aspect of liberty, 1 liberty itself, as a separate and
sustaining value, does not seem to be one of those themes.
Yet the Preamble recites "secur[ing] the Blessings of Liberty" 2 as one of the primary goals of the Constitution. Moreover, with regard to the only two appearances of "liberty" in
the text of that document-the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments'-the Supreme Court has
been remarkably inconsistent in its articulation of the substance and importance of this concept in our political structure. The often-cited dicta of Meyer v. Nebraska' painted liberty with a very broad substantive brush:
Without doubt, it [liberty] denotes not merely freedom
from bodily restraint, but also the right of the individual to
contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of
life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a
home and bring up children, to worship God according to
the dictates of his own conscience, and, generally to enjoy
those privileges long recognized at common law as essential
to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.5
To this list Meyer added the more particular right to teach or
* Professor of Law, Emory University. B.A., University of Maryland,
1971; J.D., Yale Law School, 1974; Dipl. in Law, Oxford Univ., 1980.
1. One example is Professor Laurence Tribe who identifies such
constitutional themes as "separated and divided powers," "governmental
regularity," and "preferred rights," among others. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 15, 474, 565 (1978).
2. U.S. CONST. preamble.
3. U.S. CONST. amend V, and amend XIV, 1.

4.

262 U.S. 390 (1923).

5.

Id. at 399.
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be taught a foreign language in the public schools.6 In contrast, the more recent reasoning of Paul v. Davis7 suggests
that liberty has no independent substance whatsoever, being
instead a concept derived entirely from existing positive legal
sources, whatever and however narrow they may be.8
This essay directly confronts some aspects of this confusion by making the concept of liberty itself the central concern. I shall examine liberty from both philosophical and legal perspectives, the former in a brief definitional analysis of
the concept as a whole, the latter examining liberty as one of
the core, foundational elements of the American Constitution. Because the subject of liberty is so broad, complex, and
controversial, however, my comments are necessarily incomplete. I do not pretend to have exhausted in this short paper
the full range of issues, positions, and resolutions that this
topic easily generates, nor do I intend to catalogue in text or
footnotes the overwhelming mass of erudite comment on this
subject. Rather, as the central paper presented to a symposium of scholars, this essay intends to provoke further critical
discussion of both the theoretical range and descriptive detail
of my analysis.
I have organized my effort around three broad themes.
First, I attempt to anchor the analysis in a detailed understanding of the meaning of the term "liberty" itself, a task
that surprisingly few commentators have seriously under6. Id. at 400-403.
7. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
8. Those sources would of course include the Constitution and its
listing of freedoms in the Bill of Rights, but potentially very little else:
The case's rationale would confine the federal content of "liberty"
to specific constitutional guarantees and to the Roe right to privacy, and, perhaps, to the Framers' understanding of liberty as
freedom from personal restraint.
Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405, 424
(1977) (emphasis in original). Professor Monaghan's reference here to the
Framers' understanding of liberty is, however, questionable, as I shall note
later. One difficulty with this reasoning is that it depends upon the standard reference to Blackstone, but his narrow reference to liberty must be
contrasted with his expansive notion of the content of the term "life,"
which also appears in our Due Process Clauses:
Those seeking to minimize the range of the Due Process Clauses
stress Blackstone's narrow definition of "liberty." . . . What they
fail to mention is that his adjacent definition of "life" referred to
"the right of personal security [which] consists in a person's legal
and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his
health, and his reputation."
J. -ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 192 n. 28 (1980).
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taken. 9 This requires development of the remarkable array of
states of affairs that can be, and have been in various writings, subsumed within this concept. Second, this philosophical
exercise enables me to discuss from some fresh perspectives
the legal and constitutional context within which the term
liberty has acquired special meaning. Finally, elaboration of
the philosophical and legal foundations of liberty permits me
to make some concluding comments concerning the modern
political context within which the concept of liberty should
be understood.9. Exceptions include, e.g., W. REESE, DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY
AND RELIGION: EASTERN AND WESTERN THOUGHT 179-181 (1980); M. ADLER,
THE IDEA OF FREEDOM: A DIALECTICAL EXAMINATION OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF

FREEDOM (1958); Partridge, Freedom in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 221
(1967); and NOMOS.IV: LIBERTY (C. Friedrich, ed. 1962) (hereinafter cited
as NoMos). Others have been rigorous, of course, but with a particular normative ax to grind. See, e.g., M. ROTHBARD, THE ETHICS OF LIBERTY (1982).
Concerning Mortimer Adler's efforts, Giovanni Sartori had the following
cogent general criticism, with which I agree:
Mortimer J. Adler's work . . . is a precious mine of information
...
I disagree, however, both with the classification and the
method, which he calls "dialectical." The concepts of each author
are treated in a historical vacuum, independently of the circumstances and motives that prompted them. Thus in Adler's presentation one misses both the fact that different theses were held for
the same reason, and that many differences are due to the fact
that the same thing is being said under different circumstances.
G. SARTORI, DEMOCRATIC THEORY 314 n.2 (1962). In the terminology developed in this essay, Adler's effort is unsatisfactory because it attempts to
isolate normative essences, rather than descriptive essences, from his many
sources, a task both different from and more difficult than the one
mounted here, and also one subject to precisely the criticisms Sartori
raises.
The Nomos volume is a somewhat specialized collection of articles focusing to one degree or another on John Stuart Mill's famous essay On Liberty,
this because the volume had originally been planned as a centennial observation of the publication of Mill's essay. Several of the articles, however,
are of more general interest, and in fact bear directly on the type of analysis attempted in the present paper. In this regard, see Oppenheim, Freedom
An Empirical Interpretation, NoMos at 274; Somerville, Toward a Consistent Definition of Freedom and Its Relation to Value, id. at 289; and Deutsch,
Strategies of Freedom: The Widening of Choices and the Change of Goals, id. at
301.
Another work that deserves special mention, both because its initial focus is on the effort to define the concept of liberty, and because the author
is somewhat critical of the style of linguistic analysis I employ in this paper,
is B. LEONI, FREEDOM AND THE LAW (1961).
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THE ELEMENTS OF LIBERTY

A particularly challenging task in this investigation of liberty is to establish a general analytical foundation for subsequent constitutional discussions. The difficulty, of course, is
not that so much has been written about this concept.
Rather, this vast body of literature elucidates the true problem concerning the fundamental importance and daunting
ambiguity of the term. Indeed, this substantive uncertainty
might be viewed as so severe and endemic as to make the
concept one to be condemned and avoided rather than studied and clarified.1" I reject this extreme position, and there10. This could be the view of someone like, for example, Peter Westen, who believes that the term "equality" is a superfluous and dangerous
word. While he recognizes that the term is composed of both descriptive
and prescriptive elements, he argues that the prescriptive component is
nevertheless ultimately in control. Thus, use of a general term like equality
hides and distorts those underlying policy issues, thereby exacerbating
rather than helping to resolve any debate. See Westen, To Lure the Tarantula From Its Hole: A Response, 83 COL. L. REv. 1186 (1983); Westen, The
Meaning of Equality in Law, Science, Math, and Morals: A Reply, 81 MICH. L.
REV. 604 (1983) [hereinafter Equality in Law]; Westen, On "Confusing
Ideas": Reply, 91 YALE L.J. 1153 (1982); Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality,
95 HARv. L. REV. 537 (1982). As one can tell from these titles, most of this
series is prompted by the criticism of his thesis by other scholars. See
Greenawalt, How Empty is the Idea of Equality? 83 COL. L. REV. 1167 (1983);
Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REV. 245 (1983); Chemerinsky, In
Defense of Equality: A Reply to Professor Westen, 81 MICH. L. REV. 575 (1983);
D'Amato, Comment: Is Equality a Totally Empty Idea?, 81 MICH. L. REV. 600
(1983).
The most basic problem with Westen's reasoning is that all relational
terms suffer from the difficult dichotomy of description and justification
upon which he has focused, including the most basic of legal classics like
"contract," "tort, ""crime," even "law." Each of these terms depends in
the final analysis on some normative conclusion that certain facts concerning agreement or injury or whatever are relevant while others are not, or
that some facts are more important than others. Despite this inevitable theoretical reference, one can nevertheless examine the "facts" of the actual
usage of these terms over time to help identify that underlying normative
foundation, or at least to conclude that some theories fit the "data" somewhat better than others. Of course, one could also argue that some of this
data is simply wrongheaded and therefore to be discounted-this would
indicate even more forcefully the primacy of theory over definition. But
this dominance is not absolute, for any theory that rejects "too much" of
the data is always greeted with a healthy skepticism. In other words, justification and description inevitably work together to produce the substance
of any term used in a legal context.
This fact is revealed in Westen's own analysis. While he condemns the
term "equality" for its inherent normative ambiguity, Westen is always
careful to reassure his readers and critics that he yet retains his liberal cre-
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fore attempt to distill from the literature some of the essential elements of liberty. I endeavor to establish the essence of
what it is that people are arguing about when they disagree
about the requirements of "liberty."'"
dentials. He asserts that while "equality" makes no sense to him, he nevertheless believes in rules prohibiting discrimination based on race, etc. See,
e.g., Equality in Law, supra at 663. What he never satisfactorily discloses is
why he believes in such things. It must be because he believes the world
would be a better or happier place if such rules were in place. But in what
respects? Clearly there is some normative foundation-some theoretical
driving force-to Westen's support of particular policies, but he refuses to
label that moral sense a belief in some innate human "equality" because
the term is too vague. One must wonder, then, whether under his exacting
sense of language there is any word or set of words he could use to justify
his otherwise rather isolated conclusions. If there is some organizing principle behind his thoughts, and I have no doubt that there is, then he is in
many ways committing the same sins of normative vagueness that he associates with "equality." This methodological backsliding is not the product of
ignorance; rather, it is due to the fact that this conjunction of definition
and theory is at the heart of the nature of the way we use language, particularly in relational contexts such as the law where human actions are being
assessed and guided.
Thus, the better response to the substantive difficulties caused by, and
inherent in, the definition-theory dichotomy is not despair and language
purification through elimination, but rather more exacting study of the nature of terminological equivocation. "Liberty" will be a good test case. It,
like several other terms, including "equality," "fairness," and "security," is
one of the stirring foundational concepts of that legal Olympus we all
seek-"justice." It is by its very nature, then, heavily normative, but there
is considerable analytic clarity to be gained by at least attempting to distill
from the vast data bank of scholarly and judicial comment some essential
descriptive features that characterize the proper use of the term. This
point is reiterated in different form in notes 14 and 19, infra.
11. I have been careful to this point, and shall be careful throughout this essay, to avoid use of the term "freedom" rather than "liberty."
Although I have done so in order to minimize unnecessary confusion, focusing on only one of these terms raises the inevitable question of whether
there is any meaningful distinction between liberty and freedom. For purposes of this essay, the two shall be treated as synonomous, as most writers
seem to assume.
However, there are some suggestions of a distinction between the two
that should at least be noted. W. Reese makes the following general
observation:
The term [liberty], like freedom has two senses: one is the metaphysical capacity to make decisions freely; the other is the social
fact of having a certain amount of elbow-room within society
... .In English, although both terms are used in both of these
senses, the tendency is to use the term "freedom" to refer to the
metaphysical situation of choice, and the term "liberty" to refer to
the area of non-constraint granted man (or which should be
granted him) within society.
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Description and Justification

The concept of liberty can be better understood in the
first instance simply by improving the structure of the investigation itself. Toward that end, one proposition that is central
to all aspects of my analysis is that the term "liberty," like
other words that state broad principles, is a summary term
connoting a complex interaction among numerous constituent elements. The key to understanding the concept of liberty, then, is the comprehension of these elements. I thus argue that liberty is comprised of several sustaining, generic
features that make historical and cross-cultural comparisons
2
possible, although hardly free from controversy.'
The technique I employ to begin to develop some sense
of the substance of the term "liberty" is one that is often
used by scholars but seldom recognized and analyzed." I rely
W. Reese,

DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION: EASTERN & WESTERN

305 (1980). In addition, one might be able to distinguish between liberty and freedom on the basis of the "nonharm" criterion that I
will posit as part of my definition. See pp. 554-560, infra. That is, one might
argue that while the term "liberty" does not include the option to harm
others with your actions, "freedom" does. Thus, liberty perhaps inherently
takes on a normative element that the broader concept of freedom does
not. I do not consider this point to be critical to later discussions, however,
and I therefore do not pursue it seriously, although I will return to it
briefly in the development of the nonharm criterion.
12. These "sub-atomic particles," if you will, are elements that can
vary in degree, just as the number of protons, neutrons, and electrons that
comprise various atoms will differ. But this analogy to physics ultimately
fails and thereby reveals one of the important conclusions I shall develop:
While distinct arrangements of sub-atomic particles yield atoms of quite
distinct physical properties, and hence atoms that are given different
names, changing the "amount" of one or more of the variables that comprise liberty will, within certain limits, still produce a social product that
can be labeled "liberty."
13. For a summary, yet extensive, discussion of the definition-theory
dichotomy, see Summers, Legal Philosophy Today - An Introduction, in ESSAYS
THOUGHTS

IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY

1 (R. Summers ed. 1968), in which the distinction is

described as being between "conceptual studies," id. at 1-3, on one hand,
and "rational justification," id. at 1, 5-7, on the other. See generally A.J.
AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC (1952); J. FINNIs, NATURAL LAW AND
NATURAL RIGHTS 1-18 (1980); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 1-17
(1961); L. WIT-rGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G. Anscombe &
R. Rhees 3d ed. 1971); Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence,70 LQ.
REV. 37 (1954); Putnam, The Analytic and the Synthetic, in 3 MINNESOTA
STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 358 (1962); Ross, Tu-Tu, 70 HARP.
L. REV. 812 (1957); Shuman, Jurisprudence and the Analysis of Fundamental
Legal Terms, 8 J. LEGAL EDUC. 437 (1956); Simpson, The Analysis of Legal
Concepts, 80 L. Q. REV. 535 (1964). See also the articles cited in notes 9 and
10, supra.
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upon the very basic philosophical proposition that there is a
significant, although not necessarily absolute, distinction between the description of what a term means and the justification behind the use of that meaning.14 In the specific context
of the term "liberty," initially, I attempt to differentiate between the various states of affairs that have been identified as
associated with the proper use of this word as a part of our
language, and the reasons that justify or explain from a
moral or merely prudential perspective the characterization
of these "facts" in this fashion.
The usefulness of this distinction between description
and justification as a methodology depends on first establishing a workable descriptive definition of the term in question.
Although there is considerable debate about the actual technique or series of events by which a term in our language
gains a generally accepted meaning, 1 5 I bypass much of this
14. See Terrell, "Property," "Due Process," and the Distinction Between
Definition and Theory in Legal Analysis, 70 GEO. L. J. 861, 862-63, 865-68
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Property, Due Process].
The separation of this descriptive exercise from normative assessment is
remarkably problematic, however, as I noted earlier in connection with the
recent work by Peter Westen. See note 10, supra. Another good example is
the term "speech." Investigation of language usage could demonstrate that
not every sound coming from a human's mouth will be called speech, but
these conclusions, which really concern the location of the boundary and
the internal ranking of members of the "speech" set, could just as easily be
based on a normative judgment. For example, whether wearing an armband should be classified as within the set of activities given the label
"speech" (see Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969)) may be decided rather differently from descriptive and justificatory
points of view. Purely definitionally or linguistically, one might be hardpressed to conclude that such an action had enough in common with the
ordinary sense of speaking to be given the same label, and indeed that is
one reason why those in favor of a broad application of the First Amendment refer more often to a "freedom of expression." See, e.g., T. EMERSON,
THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970). But this reflects, of course,
normative theory at work: There is some "good reason" that suggests that
the normal, perhaps rather narrow set of cases comprising the definition of
"speech" should be expanded to include this new entrant. Here the reason
is to give this activity of wearing an armband the protection of the First
Amendment, which in turn is based on a deeper reason endemic to that
part of the Constitution.
15. The philosophy of language has a rich and varied bibliography.
In addition to the material cited in notes 13 and 14, supra, some of the
more basic or well-known of the works in this area include: D. COOPER,
PHILOSOPHY AND THE NATURE OF LANGUAGE (1973); I. HACKING, WHY DOES
LANGUAGE MATTER TO PHILOSOPHY? (1975); J. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS (1969);
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (J. Searle, ed., 1971); W. QUINE, WORD AND
OBJECT (1960);
N. CHOMSKY, REFLECTIONS ON LANGUAGE (1975); L.
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controversy by simply adopting what seems to me the most
persuasive depiction of this process, and indeed one that has
been employed in scholarly discussion of the law:"6 to generate, the "central case ' 17 or "focal meaning""' of the term
through careful examination of the instances of actual use in
a given society. This central or focal usage is the archetypical,
but not necessarily the most frequently occurring, use of the
term. It is the usage that everyone would agree is "proper."
It is the meaning that captures all the essential elements of
the term, some of which might be missing in other usages of
the word. It is, in fact, the use of the term to which all other
instances of invocation are compared. 9
WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LoGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS

(F. Pears and B. McGuin-

ness, trans., 2d ed., 1972); L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS
(G.E.M. Anscombe, trans., 3d ed., 1971); R. M. HARE, THE LANGUAGE OF
MORALS (1952).
16. See notes 13 and 14, supra.
17. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, 4, 16 (1961).
18. J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 6, 9-11 (1980).
19. Hence, on this rudimentary construct, there are three distinct
activities that must be pursued in order to complete the definitional exercise: the central case must be established; the outer boundary must be identified; and some explication must be made of the organizational principle

by which the many cases within the set array themselves such that some are
"closer" to the focal core while others are further away.
While the principal task of the present section is to suggest a multi-faceted focal meaning of "liberty," its significance can best be appreciated if
one understands in more detail these three aspects of the definitional exercise, and their relationship to one another. First, with regard to the central
case, the elements identified as the essence of the concept of liberty will be,
as noted earlier, distilled from a great deal of thoughtful comment published over a long period of time. But those features focused upon should
be common to all these discussions. In order to do this, however, the listed
features will of necessity be somewhat general in character. Thus, to make
this development of a focal meaning useful one must make a compromise
between a specificity that excludes too much and a generality that excludes
too little. I shall attempt to describe in this paper, then, a central case
whose elements themselves do not depend upon any particular normative
foundation for their inclusion, although the full implication of those ele-

ments will certainly depend upon a significant theoretical debate. That is,
while the central case will be as purely descriptive as possible, the outer
boundary of the set and the internal arrangement of the members of the
set will no doubt be a function of both description and normative
assessment.
To understand why this is so brings us, then, to the separate definitional
activities of setting the boundary and arranging the internal cases, which
can be described in the following manner. Once the core case of "liberty"
is established, all other instances of use of the term will be distinguished
from this case by their lack, completely or to some degree, of one or more
of the elements that comprise the central case. Thus, the focal meaning of
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This process of comparison is the exercise that actually
establishes the full definition of the term in qpestion, for
once the multitude of instances of use are examined a set of
"proper" uses can be discerned. This set, if one imagines it
to be a simple circle, has the focal meaning of the term at its
center and a boundary surrounding that core at some disliberty will be its "strongest" general meaning. As more and more elements are missing in any example, or the degree of the elements it retains
diminishes, the further that instance will be from the central case. At some
point, of course, the degree of connection between the central case and the
example will be so tenuous that the relationship will be denied-in other
words, the example will be seen as "outside" the "boundary" of the set.
Furthermore, the "distance" of any particular case from the central case
may not be simply a function of the number of missing core elements; it
may instead be a function of the relative "importance" of the elements it
may be lacking. For example, one might conclude that the "right to sell"
an item is so critical to its designation as "property" that the absence of
this feature is enough to make such an instance of ownership an extremely
peripheral example of "property," if not outside the set altogether. A diagram depicting such a situation appears in Property, Due Process, supra n.
14, at 873 n.48.
One very important feature of the nature of words as linguistic symbols
is revealed by the definitional process, and it explains why in some contexts
a listener can be perplexed to hear two speakers expound upon the same
subject and yet seem to have nothing in common with each other. The sole
determinant for inclusion in or exclusion from the set of instances granted
a particular label under the technique I have specified is the comparison of
any example to the central case, not a comparison to any other member in
the set. Thus, if the focal meaning of a given term were established using
four fundamental elements-A, B, C, and D-one peripheral case within
the set associated with that term might have features A and B while another has C and D. Consequently, any debate between exponents of these
two views would be meaningful only with reference to, and hence with an
understanding of the significance of, the central case. The conceptual difficulty may typify to some extent, for example, the debate to be examined in
more detail later between those who believe liberty can only be achieved
within the context of an unregulated market and those who find that situation to represent the antithesis of freedom.
For some readers, the attempted separation of descriptive from normative elements in our language analysis may seem to accomplish very little
since the ultimate substance of any term will, as I have noted, depend to
one degree or another on a normative assessment. This conclusion, however, like Peter Westen's, discussed in note 10 supra, gives up too much.
For example, even a word as general as "good" can be given a helpful
conceptual structure by simply examining its place and use in our actual
linguistic practices, as R. M. Hare demonstrated in THE LANGUAGE OF
MORALS (1952). While we may all disagree markedly over our conclusions
as to what should be labeled as "good," we all do agree that the term
means something positive, etc. What I have attempted in the first part of
this essay, then, is to establish this agreed-upon conceptual core to the complicated topic of "liberty."
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tance away, capturing within it the20 factual instances to which
the term could be and is applied.
B.

The Focal Meaning of Liberty

Having considered many discussions of the concept of
liberty, I submit the following as its focal definitional meaning, some portions of which I shall examine in more detail
below:
The central, archetypical situation of "liberty" is an
agent capable of a rational choice of thought or action
among significantly distinct and meaningful alternatives none of which will cause foreseeable and proximate harm to the liberty of others, where neither the
decision to choose nor the distinctiveness or meaningfulness of the range of options is directly and deliberately constrained or diminished by the actions of persons other than the agent.
This definition posits three primary features: a "choice"
among "alternatives" where any "constraints" are nonhuman in origin. Since various sub-characteristics are also
noted, the central case in fact includes nine total elements
that should be investigated separately: (1) a choice (2) concerning either thought or action that is (3) rational and
among alternatives that are (4) significantly distinct from
each other, (5) individually meaningful, and (6) will cause no
harm to the liberty of others that is (7) foreseeable and (8)
proximate, where (9) any constraints on the act of choosing
or the set of alternatives are not caused by the will of others.
In order to keep this essay manageable and to place emphasis
on the constitutional context of the concept of liberty, I examine further only elements (1), (4), (5), (6), and (9).
Moreover, this initial attempt at a comprehensive
description of the concept of liberty only refers to a "situation" or factual circumstance in which an agent might be "at
liberty." It lacks some crucial relational elements that will
transform it into a true "moral" or "political" situation.
Those elements are subsumed within the notion of a "right
to" the sort of choice described above, a topic that is also
given brief attention in Part II of this essay.
20. Property, Due Process, supra note 14, contains several diagrams
depicting this idea. See id. at 866, 867, and 873 n. 48.
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Choice

The element of choice is necessary to give the concept of
liberty its essential moral flavor of individual free will. 2 ' The
existence of alternatives alone that might be selected randomly, for example, is not a situation of liberty; there must
also be a conscious decision. This relates the definition to the
category of liberty Mortimer Adler describes as "natural liberty," 2 2 or the inherent endowment or ability of man as a
conscious, rational animal, capable of action, to act on various desires or motives.
2.

Distinct and Meaningful Alternatives

Just as an inability to choose among a set of options renders those options meaningless regarding the concept of liberty, so too an ability to choose among non-existent alternatives cannot be considered part of one's concept of liberty.
But while we all might. agree that absence of any choice
among alternatives is not a circumstance of liberty, the existence of some level of selection among options, no matter how
minimal, will begin the debate. Instead of engaging directly
in the dispute over how much and what types of alternatives
are "enough" for liberty to exist, however, I employ a definitional technique which starts from the other direction and
first identifies the characteristics of those alternatives that
typify an indisputable situation of liberty.
I have identified three such characteristics, two of which
I discuss in this section and one which I discuss in the next.
The two features examined here are those that are important
from the point of view of the prospective agent. The central
case of liberty about which there would be no dispute would
be where the agent faces a choice among alternatives that are
both (1) significantly different from one another and (2) each
21. In the absence of this assumption, talk of "liberty" becomes either meaningless or very narrow in range, and not in accord, I believe,
with the generally accepted sense of that word. For general discussions of
the topic of free will and its opposite - various aspects of determinism see, e.g., Summers, Legal Philosophy Today - An Introduction, in ESSAYS IN
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 1, 7 (R. Summers ed. 1968), and W. Reese, DICTIONARY
OF PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION 181 (1980).
See also Deutsch, Strategies of Freedom: The Widening of Choices and the
Change of Goals, in NoMos, supra note 9 at 301-02 (" . . . we may then
define freedom as the range of effective choices open to an actor, such as
an individual or a group of persons.")
22. Adler, supra note 9, at 148-156.
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of some consequence or importance to the agent.2 3 In the
jargon I have adopted, the alternatives must be "distinct"
and "meaningful." The requirement of significant difference
eliminates from the central case any situation in which the
agent has a choice between options that, while not identical,
present him agent with what he considers to be a single
course of action. For example, the sole choice of eating either apple A or apple B plucked from the same tree on the
same day is not a central situation of liberty. But precisely
how much difference there must be between choices in order
create a "significant" distinction is of course a very difficult
matter, and one that is usually resolved by implicit or explicit
reference to some underlying theory rather than to pure
definition.2 4
The requirement of meaningfulness of the available alternatives eliminates from the central case of liberty choices
that, while significantly different from each other, are not
compatible with any short or long term goals of the agent.2 5
23. A very difficult notion that this latter feature of meaningfulness
introduces to an analysis of liberty - but one that is not directly considered here to any significant degree - is the extent to which "importance
to the agent" makes liberty an inherently individual concept. Lack of liberty could, in the final analysis, simply be inthe mind of the agent. If so if liberty is thus like art, for example - then we lose much of our ability to
discuss the matter intelligibly, particularly from a social and political perspective. I have attempted to avoid this difficulty to a certain extent by
giving this definitional element of meaningfulness some more definite content, grounded in various domains of life. See pp. 555-560. But this does
not avoid the more basic point that eventually, in establishing the legal or
constitutional content of liberty, for example, some reference will inevitably be made to some general, aggregate standard of "reasonableness" regarding individual claims of interference with the meaningfulness of one's
choices.
24. For example, depending on the point one wants to make, or on
one's personal tastes and sensibilities, any of the following could be considered "non-distinct" choices that remove the agent from the central case of
liberty: the choice of working in any of three otherwise identical factories
in a given town; the option to purchase either of two automobiles made by
different manufacturers that are equivalent in all performance and structural characteristics and differ only in external cosmetic appearance; the
alternative of listening to either Haydn's 97th or 98th symphonies. Even if
one concludes that these are in fact non-distinct choices, this by itself does
not mean, of course, that all these situations are necessarily outside the set
labeled "liberty;" at this point it only means that these situations are not
central examples. At least now, however, the debate concerning them is
somewhat more focused.
25. This point has been made by different authors in many different
ways. Karl Deutsch, for example, defined freedom as "the range of effective
choices open to an actor." Deutsch, Strategies of Freedom: The Widening of
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The simplest example is the choice given the victim by a robber demanding "your money or your life." Neither option
would in other circumstances be considered viable or interesting to the agent, and the fact that there is a choice here
between significantly different alternatives does not place this
within the set of situations under the rubric of liberty. Nor
would the simple choice between jumping to one's death off a
bridge or not doing so be one characteristic of liberty.2" A set
of alternatives is at the central case of liberty when it is
within the reasonable contemplation of the prospective agent
to pursue at least two of its members.
Choices and the Change of Goals, in NOMOS, supra note 9 at 302. So defined,
freedom had four primary elements: "[tjhe absence of restraint," "[t]he
presence of opportunity," "[t]he capacity to act," and "[tJhe awareness of
the reality without - including both unrestrainedness and opportunity and of the actor's own capacity." Id.
Alan Gewirth refers to the distinction between short- and long-term considerations as the difference between "occurrent" and "dispositional" impacts. For example, in his discussion of the duty to rescue, Gewirth notes
that
[b]oth the harm impending to the recipient and the agent's ability
to ward off this harm may be regarded either as occurrent or as
dispositional. If they are regarded as occurrent, consideration is
given only to the directly impending harm and to what can be directly done to avoid it. But if they are regarded as dispositional,
consideration is given to the longer-range causes and background
conditions that do or may bring about the directly impending
harm and to the longer-range action required to remove these
causes and conditions.
A. GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY 230 (1978). The dichotomy of occurrent and dispositional is introduced in id. at 32.
Concerning the general notion of a "life-plan," many philosophers have
made reference to and use of it in a wide variety of contexts, and it is not
necessary here to defend any particular discussion of it. For one such example, see, e.g., R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 50 (1974):
What is the moral importance of [the] . . . ability to form a picture of one's whole life (or at least of significant chunks of it) and
to act in terms of some overall conception of the life one wished to
lead?
I conjecture that the answer is connected with that elusive and
difficult notion: the meaning of life. A person's shaping his life in
accordance with some overall plan is his way of giving meaning to
his life; only a being with the capacity to so shape his life can have
or strive for meaningful life.
Other authors relate such ideas to a general "theory of the good." See, e.g.,
J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 395-452 (1971).
26. Except perhaps to a person considering suicide, such a choice
between a viable option-not jumping-and a nonviable
one-jumping-is not really a choice at all since only one alternative is, in
our jargon, "meaningful."
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The element of meaningfulness is perhaps the most complex factor in the matrix I have established. The idea that
meaningfulness can simply be defined in terms of an agent's
general "life-plan" is not only vague but dissatisfying. Given
our goal of establishing the true central case of liberty, that
case regarding which everyone would agree that the agent
enjoys a sort of "complete" freedom, more needs to be said
concerning the content of meaningfulness. I propose a
description of that content, although in the context of this
essay it is only a rather rough approximation.
I assume that there are four basic domains within which
one's life as a whole is conducted:2"
27.

On the idea of "domains of life," see, e.g., J.

WHAT'S FAIR? AMERICAN
M.

HOCHSCHILD,
BELIEFS ABOUT DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE (1981) and

WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE:

A

DEFENSE OF PLURALISM

AND

EQUALITY

(1983). The former identifies three primary domains of life-the social,
the economic, and the political-and examines the differing senses of distributive justice that obtain in each, ranging from rather strict equality of
persons to marked differentiation among persons. In contrast, the latter
identifies three primary distributive principals - free exchange, desert,
and need - and examines their application in a series of more or less discrete realms of life, ranging from, for example, "membership" in the political community, the attainment of political office, and pursuit of personal
affection and divine grace.
The idea of dividing life into various "domains" for purposes of understanding the full range of the potential application of the concept of liberty
was also expressed in two different, but useful, ways in two articles in the
NoMos volume, supra note 9. John Somerville put it in the form of a linguistic issue:
When trying to define a term which we are already using in a wide variety of contexts, it is of course necessary first of all to seek a definition
which will express some complex of features common to all the acknowledged referents, and to nothing else. In the case of freedom, the first desideratum is to find, if possible, a peculiar common denominator basic to
such different types of freedom as political, economic,, moral, physical, religious, and the like. Their differences are important, but their presumptive
common ground is just as, if not more, important. For example, what
makes political freedom political is a certain governmental context not
shared with all types of freedom; but what makes political freedom freedom
is necessarily a common core which is shared with all types of freedom.
Otherwise, we should have to employ separate nouns, rather than one
noun and separate adjectives.
Somerville, Toward a Consistent Definition of Freedom and its Relation to
Value, in NoMos, supra note 9 at 289-290. Frank Knight, on the other
hand, stated it in sociological terms:
Society is a vastly complex congeries of groups, with the family
as the minimum effective unit, made up largely of dependents; and
the same is largely true of political society as well. .

.

. For what is

called "individualism" a more descriptive term would be "familism," but many other groups of a more or less primary or face-to-
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(1) the moral or aesthetic, in which one's personal vision
of virtue, wisdom, and character is pursued;
(2) the social or communal, in which one establishes
more immediate interpersonal relationships;
(3) the political, in which one participates in or at least
has some share in governmental sovereignty; and
(4) the economic,
in which one competes for scarce con28
sumable resources.
There are choices in each of these domains, and consequently a sense of liberty in each of them. The most extreme
form of meaningfulness in the array of alternative choices
faced by anyone would therefore be a situation in which the
agent had meaningful choices in each of these areas. The
central case of liberty, in turn, would require this full sense
of meaningfulness.
In addition, I noted earlier that meaningfulness can be
defined in terms of both short and long-range plans concerning the conduct of one's life. For example, there is a difference between deciding whether to engage in the debate concerning some social issue and choosing between two political
candidates in a democratic election, or between deciding
whether to read books in order to gain information and the
option to choose between two particular books on some subject. I summarize this additional variable in the concept of
meaningfulness as the difference between "general" and
"specific" alternatives. As an element of meaningfulness, it is
relevant to each of the domains of life identified above.
Therefore, the central case of liberty demands not only a set
of choices within each domain, but somewhat separate sets of
face nature must be taken into account.
[Wjhat is practically in question is much less the freedom of
individuals, in any literal sense, than freedom of groups and freedom of individuals to form groups and act as groups. As pointed
out above, the minimum effective unit in a continuing society is
the family, and that is only one in a vague and shifting congeries
of groups up to the sovereign state, which itself is but one of many
groups in the world.
Knight, Some Notes on Political Freedom and on a Famous Essay, in NoMos,
supra note 9 at 115, 117. In this same volume, Felix Oppenheim made the
same point in a slightly different form. See Oppenheim, Freedom - An Empirical Interpretation, in NoMos, supra note 9 at 276.
28. These areas are clearly not antonymous or mutually exclusive,
but their degree of inevitable overlap is not so great that they cannot be
separately identified for purposes of the analysis of liberty.

JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol.

I

both general and specific alternatives within these areas." In
this way, liberty becomes a very rich concept indeed.
With the double requirement that alternatives be both
distinct and meaningful, the absolute number of available options seems unimportant to the definition of liberty. A choice
between two distinct and meaningful alternatives is just as
"central" an example of liberty on my account as a choice
among a hundred such options. Only when the vastness of
the array of alternatives has some impact on the "distinction"
an agent can discern among choices would the number of alternatives itself have any bearing.30
3.

Nonharmful Alternatives

The central case of liberty further requires that "alternatives" not cause harm to others. This feature, however, is significant from the point of view of others, rather than the
agent. The requirement is at once straightforward but quite
complex, mundane yet of crucial importance. It is complex
because the task of determining which effects are to be labeled "harmful" is anything but simple. It is nevertheless
crucial because this general "nonharm" feature distinguishes
the concept of "liberty" from that of "license."
To address the latter point first, I acknowledge the
highly controversial nature of the differentiation of liberty
and license. This dichotomy may appear to introduce a normative proposition into my attempt at a purely descriptive
analysis of liberty. That is, I now seem to be suggesting that
liberty, properly understood, means the freedom to do as one
ought, and not as one desires, a proposition involving "self29. As I will note later, this means in effect that "general" rights are
in fact made up of a set of "specific" rights, and the absence of a significant
number of the latter may call into question the existence of the former.
30. The necessary corrollary of this conclusion is that I must reject
the idea that we have "more liberty" today because there are more options
available to us concerning how we may spend our time. I concede that
there are now more choices available, but that does not mean that the situation faced by an agent in 1791 must therefore be considered a peripheral,
or non-central case of liberty. To conclude otherwise would mean that we
would have to consider our present situation as peripheral as well since we
can reasonably assume that technology will continue to progress and give
us even more choices in the future. Thus, under this reasoning, there is no
existing central case of liberty, since it would exist, if at all, somewhere in
the distant future. I disagree strongly with this way of viewing the concept
of liberty because the definitional technique that I believe actually obtains
in our language requires a "real" or identifiable central case if comparisons
are to be made and the full substance of a term developed.
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perfection" rather than "self-realization."'" This idea, however, has been attacked by many writers, including Jeremy
Bentham," Robert Hale, 83 and Freidrich von Hayek, 4 and I
31. See M. ADLER, THE IDEA OF FREEDOM 224 (1958):
When self-realization authors, such as Hobbes, Bentham, Mill, and
Russell, say that every law curtails freedom, the freedom they are
talking about is altogether different from that which such selfperfection authors as Boucher, Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel have in
mind when they say that law, far from being an infringement of
liberty, is its foundation. The latter deny . . . that there is any
truly human freedom in doing as one pleases.
See also J. LOCKE, OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT: SECOND ESSAY, Ch. VI, §57.
IT]he end of law is, not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and
enlarge freedom . . . . [For all] beings capable of laws, where
there is no law there is no freedom.
John Somerville has expanded on Locke's reasoning:
There is, of course, no such thing as a country, a press, or a
man simply free-free in general. Free in general would mean
free from everything, the total absence of all manner of constraint. No country, press, or man could, or would want to, exist
in such a condition, even if it were momentarily possible. What is
universally desired is the removal of just those constraints that
happen to be considered bad, artificial, or unhealthy, and which
must be specified in order that we may understand one another,'
since there are great differences about such evaluations. But remove all constraints, and whatever you are dealing with - country,
press, man, or anything else - vanishes into thin air physically, and
is reduced to zero morally, since necessary roots, relationships,
and conditioning influences are cut away.
Somerville, Toward a Consistent Definition of Freedom, in NoMos, supra note
9 at 296.
Felix Oppenheim's more general, and more jaundiced, observations on
this controversy are also useful:
Making kidnappers unfree to engage in their activities is a necessary condition for preserving the freedom of movement of their
potential victims. The latter group is, of course, much larger than
the former, and this may be the reason for the claim that such
governmental measures enhance liberty in general. More likely
this statement is to be interpreted as a disguised value judgment to
the effect that freedom of movement is worth preserving at the
*
expense of the freedom of those who intend to destroy it. There is
no such thing as liberty in general; there are only specific actions
or types of actions which one person or group is either free or
unfree to perform with respect to another.
Oppenheim, Freedom - An Empirical Interpretation, in NoMos, supra note 9
at 282.
32. J. BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 94-95 (C. Ogden, ed.
1950): "Is not the liberty to do evil liberty? If not, what is it? . . . Do we
not say that it is necessary to take away liberty from idiots and bad men,
because they abuse it?"
33. R. HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW: PUBLIC CONTROL OF PRIVATE
GOVERNING POWER 3-4 (1952).

JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. I

hope to avoid this particular dispute altogether. In maintaining my focus on description, I can include this distinction between liberty and license in my definition only if I believe
that the archtypical use of the term "liberty" in our language
and culture automatically excludes certain types of actions
widely considered reprehensible or unjustified.
I submit that license is not in fact an aspect of the full
meaning of liberty for two reasons. First, I make the educated guess that empirical research on the substance of the
term liberty used in ordinary discourse would reveal that people do not understand the "good" of individual liberty to include the "bad" action of hitting someone over the head."5
My second reason is more conceptual but helps explain this
hypothetical empirical result. If the full definition or substance of a term consists of a set of factual instances that have
been granted the label in question, and if that set is formed
by a series of comparisons of cases to a central, archtypical
case of that term, then it seems highly unlikely that these
comparisons of actual cases would be made to a nonexistent
central case. Rather, the comparisons would be to an identifiable, real example. That is only possible in the case of "liberty" if harmful actions that connote the extravagance of "license" are excluded from its focal meaning."
34. F. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 73 (1944): "[E]very law restricts individual freedom to some extent by altering the means which people may use in the pursuit of their aims."
John Rawls also seems to use the term liberty in this sort of expansive
fashion. The first principle in his scheme of justice is that "each person is
to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberties compatible with
a similar liberty for others." J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 60 (1971).
This reference to "compatibility" would be unnecessary if Rawls were using the term liberty with the nonharm proviso that I have included.
Felix Oppenheim reached a similar conclusion, and noted some potential
implications of excluding license from the realm of liberty:
[It would mean], of course, that you are free provided you do, or
are being made to do, what some one believes you ought to do. So
freedom becomes identified with desirable restraints imposed on
the individual by government, or the moral law, or his own conscience. No wonder that freedom has been used as a watchword by
liberals and antiliberals alike. "It is in the great name of liberty
that every vanity seeks its vengeance and its sustenance."
Oppenheim, Freedom - An Empirical Interpretation, in NoMos, supra note 9
at 287 (quoting H. TAINE, I LEs ORIGINALS DE LA FRANCE CONTEMPORAINE
119 (1877)).
35. This way of stating the point acknowledges the inevitable role
that normative assessment plays in the development of the actual substance
of any term, but it is not inconsistent with the present descriptive exercise.
36. This same point is made in Property, Due Process, supra note 16,
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Note, however, that this argument only concerns the central case of liberty. That is, I do not suggest that those scholars who have argued that liberty includes harmful actions
have misused the term. Rather, I contend that they are referring to a peripheral case of liberty without recognizing it as
such. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes provided a good example of the linguistic confusion on this point, and its potential
practical impact. Note the narrow manner in which he once
defined liberty when he sought to make liberty coexist with
the ability of government to regulate conduct:
Liberty implies the absence of arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interests of the community."
Justice Holmes made the opposite mistake from the scholars
who insist that harmful acts are an unavoidable aspect of liberty. While they misperceive the non-central character of
harmful acts, Justice Holmes attempted to make the central
case of liberty the only legitimate use of that term. But of
course he need not have gone this far. Including harmful acts
within the domain of liberty does not insulate them from
government impact; it simply means that our "liberty" to
commit harmful acts can be curtailed only through the "due
process" of law, as required by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution. We will turn our attention
to these matters, however, in a subsequent section.
Nevertheless, the nature of the "peripheralness" of
harmful acts, that is, the nature of the relationship between
liberty and license, is obviously determined by what "harm"
means in this context. One extreme position could be that an
action that causes any harm is an example of license. This
could mean that such an action has nothing to do with liberty, and that therefore it can be regulated without producing any reduction in the "liberty" a person enjoys. This is an
at 869-870, concerning the concept of "property": the central case of
property is one that includes limitations on the harmful use of one's possessions. Indeed, the argument made in the text is not as strong as it could be,
for it lacks one element that relates to a topic that will be developed in a
subsequent section. That element is the fact that both property and liberty
are, in their practical, operational meaning, composed of sets of rights, and
there is no general "right" to harm others. Therefore, the true central
case of liberty would recognize this rudimentary notion and exclude such
harmful choices from its definition. See pp. 25-30, infra, and note 129,
infra.
37. Chicago, B. & 0. R. Co. v. McQuire, 219 U.S. 549, 567 (1911).

JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. I

important point, but one I approach indirectly in the present
context by first establishing the central case of liberty. As I
noted, it is not necessary to determine the precise amounts or
types of interference or "harm" that will move a situation
out of the liberty set altogether. Rather, I need to determine
more narrowly the nature of "nonharm" that will characterize the central case of liberty, and conversely, the nature of
"harm" that will move us away from that case. I have done
that relatively simply, if somewhat tautologically, by reference in my definition to impact on the liberty of others."
Thus, "harm" is understood as impact on the choice-acts, sets
of alternatives, and types of constraints associated with the
actions of others. In this broad sense, a vast array of types of
physical damage, mental distress, loss of resources, and loss of
personal relationships could be considered a "harm." The
existence of such a potential harm, however, does not mean
that a set of actions would automatically be outside the "liberty" set. Instead, the presence of harm (or the absence of
nonharm) removes the specific instance being examined from
the central case of liberty.
My definitional model at least allows us to conclude that
the extreme position mentioned earlier, associating all degrees and types of harm with license rather than liberty, is
untenable. Note that neither of the other two fundamental
characteristics of alternatives at the central case of liberty
which I have mentioned, seem to operate on an "all-or-nothing" basis. "Distinctiveness" and "meaningfulness" appear to
be matters of degree from the perspective of the agent. This
facilitates a logical conclusion about the concept of harm. If
the concept of harm is associated with impacts on others' liberty, and if this liberty is composed, in part, of alternatives
that are variably distinctive and meaningful, then the concept
of harm to such liberty must also be viewed by these others as
variable. 9 This conclusion is of course consistent with the
38. There is no damaging circularity here, however. Robert Nozick,
for example, set up his system of rights in ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA
(1974) with the proviso that one could not harm the rights of others, but
he could do so because he specified (in a general sort of way) what rights
people in fact possessed. Id. at 10. Similarly, I can define harm in terms of
harm to liberty because I have made the attempt to specify the content of
that term - i.e., choices with certain characteristics. Thus, the reference
to "harm to the liberty of others" in my definition is simply a shorthand
reference to interference with these choices.
39. Both the importance and the mutable nature of the "nonharm"
requirement for the focal meaning of liberty can be demonstrated by ex-
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general view of the variable nature of the concept of liberty
itself, a variability, however, that is anchored and structured
around a central or focal case.
Even within this central case of liberty, moreover, the exercise of freedom certainly seems capable of inflicting
"harms" on others. A rousing speech concerning a government's failures may topple it, clearly causing harm to its officials. The knowledge that some perform certain religious
practices or hold certain religious beliefs may cause others
mental anguish. Yet these sorts of impacts are not "harms"
that move the freedoms of speech and religion out of the focal meaning of liberty and into the realm of license " because
ample as well. Consider those freedoms in our political system that seem
most readily associated with the idea of liberty-say, freedom of speech or
freedom of religion. These come to mind so quickly, of course, because
they are usually thought to be rather "absolute" in character. Indeed,
scholars have noted that the "absolute" nature of these freedoms seem to
relate to their "costlessness" in the sense that they consume no scarce resources-one's freedom to speak one's mind does not prevent someone
else from doing likewise or anything else for that matter. It comes as no
surprise, therefore, that these liberties are thought to be "absolute" only in
this limited context, and not when they do begin to impose external costs.
But while not absolute in some contexts-that is, despite the presence of
regulations, sometimes severe-many still find no anomaly in referring to
these as situations of "liberty." Thus, as a matter of descriptive fact, the
element of "nonharm" in the definition of "liberty" clearly seems to be a
variable one.
Moreover, the connection between the "absoluteness" and "costlessness"
of a right may be overemphasized. Instead, these freedoms can be viewed
as generally cost-effective:
The human rights about which there is consensus in the advanced democratic societies may be maintained at little or no cost,
and often even make a society richer. In the United States today,
free speech, quite apart from its more familiar advantages, probably also saves the government money, since it would take quite a
few extra policemen, jailers, and court officials to silence a people
with the habit of speaking their minds. Free speech may make it
harder for a president to get reelected, but it may reduce taxes.
The contribution that free speech makes to intellectual advance,
scientific research, and technological progress also has to be added
to the balance. Similarly, the constitutional prohibitions against arbitrary seizure of property also make a society more prosperous.
Who, for example, would want to invest in the capital goods that
increase productivity if this property could be taken away at the
whim of an official?
Olson, A Less Ideological Way of Deciding How Much Should Be Given to the
Poor, 112 DAEDALUS, Fall 1983, at 217, 220.
40. Ronald Dworkin explains this result on the basis of the difference between "personal" and "external" preferences, the latter concerning what we would like to see others doing. R. DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
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the type of "harm," and not just its degree, seems critical to
the concept of liberty. Hence, some kinds of adverse impact
are not relevant to the liberty/license dichotomy. The key to

this difference in type of harm appears to be rooted in the
definitional elements of liberty I have previously developed.
Since I have defined "harm" as impacts on others' liberty,
then an action that does not affect the distinctiveness or the
meaningfulness of the options available to someone else does
not harm this person, for the person remains at the central
case of liberty. We can therefore differentiate among types of
impacts, designating some as true "harms" and others as
largely irrelevant to a discussion of liberty."1
Since "nonharm" is crucial to the central case of liberty,
we can further conclude that an action that ends the harmful
275 (1978). Under Dworkin's theory of rights, majoritarian decisions are prohibited "that seem, antecedently, likely to have been reached
by virtue of the external components of the preferences democracy
reveals." Id. at 277. Dworkin's distinction between personal and external
preferences was recently criticized in Ely, Professor Dworkin's ExternallPersonal Preference Distinction, 1983 DUKE L. J. 959.
41. The former group would include those actions that materially
reduce the distinctiveness or meaningfulness of the array of options available to others, while the latter group would consist of actions that, if they
had any impact on others at all, do more than simply reduce the number of
possible alternatives in an already satisfactory array.
This lack of relationship between liberty and the number of options also
produces a conclusion that is the mirror image of the discussion above.
There can be no question that if a person is required to do or not do some
action simply on the ground that it will increase the number of options
available to others, this person's liberty has been "reduced" in the sense
that, ceteris paribus, he has moved from a circumstance at the focal meaning
of liberty to a non-central situation that may or may not be within the set.
This suggests a possible explanation for some of our ambivalence as a
society toward welfare programs. We do not seem to contest very often or
vociferously the basic idea that those in extreme need should be assisted the "safety net" concept. But we have great concern over both how much
assistance to give in these situations and what sorts of circumstances should
trigger the assistance process. In other words, someone interested in basing
welfare programs on a "rights" theory associated with the concept of liberty developed in this paper could very well reach the same conclusion that
an economist interested in efficiency would reach. The latter would oppose
assistance that went so far as to diminish significantly incentives for productive enterprise, while the former would oppose assistance that went beyond
that necessary to establish a "distinct" and "meaningful" set of alternative
choices concerning the recipient's life. If meaningfulness is given the more
restrictive definition I have posited - where the number of choices is not
itself directly relevant - then the assistance program could be seen as
reestablishing a "proper" sense of liberty for such individuals by providing
them with only rather small amounts of aid.
SERIOUSLY
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actions of others does not interfere with their liberty. That is,
instances such as self-defense and the overthrowing of a despotic regime interrupt the license, rather than the liberty, of
those wrongdoers. Likewise, the central case of liberty would
permit the agent to end the wrongful interferences with his
liberties by others."' Thus, to the extent the agent is unable
to regain his liberty, his lack of freedom is compounded."
Moreover, even if the agent does not presently suffer any direct interferences with his liberty, the existence of constraints
that would hamper his ability to end interferences in the future is also a current reduction in liberty, in the sense that the
agent is not now at the central case of liberty. Indeed, one
might wonder if he is in the set at all.
4.

Nonhuman Constraints

"Constraints" on our ability to make choices or on the
set of alternatives from which we may choose"' represents the
final element in the complex definitional matrix I have developed for liberty. This element obviously overlaps with the
last one involving "nonharm," for I indeed defined harm in
terms of interferences or constraints on another's liberty.
The "nonharm" element, however, is required for the central case from the point of view of others; the "nonconstraint" feature is required from the point of view of the
agent. This additional definitional characteristic distinguishes
the concept of liberty from those of "ability" and "desire" or
"taste". In a recent article, David Miller provided a convenient example of the difference among these terms:
Suppose that I enjoy taking walks along the bank of a certain river, and consider the following three possibilities:
1. The local authority which administers the river bank
erects fences around it and employs a warden to keep peo42. An interesting collection of thoughts on this point appears in
Symposium, Human Rights and Human Wrongs: Establishing a Jurisprudential
Foundationfor a Right to Violence, 32 EMORY L.J. 383 (1983).
43. Discussions related to this point appear in Richards, Rights, Resistance, and the Demands of Self-Respect, 32 EMORY L.J. 405 (1983); Greenawalt, Violence - Legal Justification and Moral Appraisal, 32 EMORY L.J. 437
(1983); and Reisman, The Tormented Conscience: Applying and Appraising Unauthorized Coercion, 32 EMORY L.J. 499.
44. The absence of such constraints is indeed the key definitional
element of liberty for many writers. See, e.g., Somerville, Toward a Consistent Definition of Freedom and Its Relation to Value, in NoMos, supra note 9 at

293, 295.
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pie off. When this happens I shall say that I am no longer
free to take my walk.
2. Brambles grow and block the path so that I can't
walk on the bank without tearing my clothes. In this event,
I shall say although I am still free to walk there, I am no
longer able to do so.
3. The river becomes littered with offensive debris.
Under these circumstances I shall say that, although I am
both free and able to walk, I no longer wish to do so.4

While my emphasis on a human cause to the constraint
on liberty, however, places my definition within the first of
Miller's categories, this categorization hardly makes the "constraints" element clear or uncontroversial." The element of
"nonconstraint" is obviously variable, and more specifically,
variable both as to "directness" of intention to constrain and
"size" or degree of the constraint. Concerning the directions
of constraint, the key is the "causal history, '4 7 as Miller calls
it, of the action that imposes the constraint: the awareness by
the person that his action is imposing a constraint; the foreseeability or probability that the constraint will result from
the action; and the number of factual causal links between
the action of this other person and the imposition of the constraint.4" Where the relationship between the outside action
45. Miller, Constraints on Freedom, 94 ETHICs 66, 68 (1983). Felix
Oppenheim also makes human interaction the key to his definition of freedom in Freedom - An Empirical Interpretation, in NoMos, supra note 9 at
275, 282-83.
46. Quite the contrary, the limitation to human constraints makes
this feature inherently normative, as Miller notes, since it requires some
assessment of human accountability. Miller, supra note 45 at 69. On the
other hand, it would be possible at this point to make this assessment
rather more objective than subjective by simply declaring that interferences with liberty that count as "true" constraints will be only direct and
deliberate obstructions of the actions of another, much as Isiah Berlin does
with his extreme form of "negative liberty." I. BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 122 (1969). See also Taylor, What's Wrong With Negative Liberty in THE
IDEA OF FREEDOM 175 (A. Ryan ed. 1979). I, along with Miller (supra note
45, at 72), reject this position, however, on the basis that it would make the
central case of liberty far too narrow, and it would accomplish this by an
implicit appeal to some normative agenda, not by reference to the manner
in which the term is in fact used.
47. Miller, supra note 45, at 70.
48. See id. at 71-75. See also MacCormick, On Legal Decisions and
Their Consequences: From Dewey to Dworkin, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 239 (1983), for
an intriguing discussion of the various kinds of consequences that can flow
from an act. MacCormick distinguishes between the immediate "results" of
an action-e.g., squeezing a trigger and making a gun fire-and its "conse-
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and the later constraint is too 'tenuous, the situation falls
within the second or third category in Miller's list. These categories describe constraints that are "natural obstacles" to
one's movements, and are irrelevant to the concept of "liberty." Agents that are indirectly and unintentionally constrained in their choices by the actions of others can therefore still be considered at the central case of liberty.
Concerning the degree of constraint, the possibilities
range broadly, from impossibility (chains and locks) to excessive monetary expense (inability to purchase) to moral pressure (a sense of obligation to perform or refrain from performing some action) to mere inconvenience. At this point,
however, a very difficult and controversial question arises:
while the existence of any of these degrees of constraint will
move the situation away from the central case of liberty, is
the entire continuum relevant to the concept of liberty? Generally, current literature seems stuck between two extreme
positions on this point, both of which are descriptively
troublesome.
One position advocates cutting off this continuum at
some point and making only some of these levels of constraint relevant to the concept of liberty. For instance, theorists as diverse as John Rawls49 and Robert Nozick 5° reject
quences"-e.g., the bullet from the gun striking and killing someone. He
further divides consequences into "causal consequences" and "ulterior outcomes," the former being more direct and immediate, and a precondition
for the latter. The kind of consequences that then "count" as legally relevant are "juridical consequences," and have the extra feature of an explicit
normative conclusion associated with them. See 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. at 246254.
49. Rawls makes an explicit distinction between liberty and what he
calls the "worth of liberty," Rawls,'supra note 34, at 204, the former being
limited to the generally "costless" basic political liberties while the latter is
a concession to the fact that we live in a world of scarce resources - that
is, while we may all share the liberty to live in Switzerland, for example,
the actual "value" of this liberty to the vast majority of us is quite low
because we cannot afford to do so. Id. In Rawls' scheme of justice, only the
basic political liberties are of critical preeminent importance, for they are
to be enjoyed equally, id.at 60, while on the other hand, the worth of
liberty is to be "maximized" from the perspective of the least advantaged
in society. Rawls concludes:
Thus liberty and the worth of liberty are distinguished as follows:
liberty is represented by the complete system of the liberties of
equal citizenship, while the worth of liberty to persons and groups
is proportional to their capacity to advance their ends within the
framework the system defines. Freedom as equal liberty is the
same for all; the question of compensating for lesser than equal
liberty does not arise. But the worth of liberty is not the same for
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the idea that inconvenience or expense can ever rise to the
level of a denial of liberty, in its proper sense. The other position advocates an opposite extreme by permitting nearly any
degree of interference with one's desired actions to raise issues of denial of liberty.5 1 This perspective is perhaps best
exemplified by the United Nations' Universal Declaration of
Human Rights,5" which can be divided into two general categories: "civil and political" 5 liberties, and "economic, social,
and cultural"" liberties. The former category contains freedoms comfortable to Western ears, as our use of the term
liberty has so often been associated with political contexts.
The latter category, however, is highly controversial and
even includes a "right to rest and leisure, including. . . perieveryone. Some have greater authority and wealth, and therefore
greater means to achieve their aims. The lesser worth of liberty is,
however, compensated for, since the capacity of the less fortunate
members of society to achieve their aims would be even less were
they not to accept the existing inequalities whenever the difference principle is satisfied. But compensating for the lesser worth
of freedom is not to be confused with making good an unequal
liberty. Taking the two principles together, the basic structure is
to be arranged to maximize the worth to the least advantaged of
the complete scheme of equal liberty shared by all. This defines
the end of social justice.
Thus, the content of the term "liberty" - insofar as various degrees of
"constraint" are considered relevant to it - has here been restricted by a
prior normative conclusion within Rawls' theory of justice, not by careful
attention to the concept itself.
50. R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 149-231 (1974) (on
"distributive justice"). For example, regarding the possibility of a "right to
life," Nozick responds that such a right would "at most . . . be a right to
have or strive for whatever one needs to live, provided that having it does
not violate anyone else's rights." Id. at 179.
51. See, e.g., H. LASKI, LIBERTY IN THE MODERN STATE (Rev. ed.
1948):
[Men] are free when the rules under which they live leave them
without a sense of frustration, in realms they deem significant
• . . They are unfree whenever the rules to which they have to
conform compel them to conduct they dislike and resent.
Insecurity is the essential antithesis of freedom.
Id. at 33, 39. See also Russell, Freedom and Government, in FREEDOM-ITS
MEANING 249, 251 (R. Anshen ed. 1940) ("Freedom in general may be
defined as the absence of obstacles to the realization of desires.")
52. G.A. Res. 217, 3 U.N. GAOR (A/810) at 71, U.N. Doc. 1/777
(1948).
53. Id. at art. 3-21.
54. Id. at art. 22-29.1.
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odic holidays with pay."' 5 5 The attempted connection of these
two groups of possible liberties has often been criticized as
attempting to link two entirely distinct subjects. As Gerald
Sirkin states, "freedom is confused with utopia. '" 5 From this
perspective, freedom is said to mean "freedom from risks;
freedom from worry; freedom from hardships, illness, responsibility, and all other unpleasant facts of human life." 7
Thus, proponents of the Declaration advocate a very
large portion of the range of possible types and degrees of
constraints on action as relevant to the term "liberty," while
opponents of the Declaration advocate a much narrower portion of such constraints as relevant. Yet neither side bases its
argument on definition; instead, the focus here is on theory.
Each includes or excludes various kinds or levels of constraint
because of some larger sense of justice that dictates the content of liberty. In a sense, then, both sides concern "utopia."
As David Miller summarizes them, one views liberty from a
capitalist perspective while the other does so from a socialist
perspective, or perhaps a bit less pejoratively, one rests in an
assumption of individual autonomy while the other assumes
the legitimacy of demands of the community. 5" Each, however, views the other as arbitrary in its use of the term
"liberty."
The debate concerning which constraints are relevant to
the concept of liberty has failed to seriously consider the actual elements of liberty to which these constraints would be
pertinent. If the debate were to focus initially on the descriptive detail of the term, some degree of common ground and
necessary connection between these two rather disparate approaches could be identified. Descriptively, there is no obvious technique by which the full range of possible constraints
on thought and action can be segmented, such that one seg55. Id. at art. 24. See also art. 25.1:
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the
health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food,
clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services,
and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness,
disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.
56. Sirkin, The Future of Government Regulation and Freedom, in THE
FUTURE OF OUR LIBERTIES 177 (S. Halpern ed. 1982).
57. Id. See also M. CRANSTON, WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS? Ch. VIII
(1973).
58. Miller, supra note 45, at 67, 81-85. A similar point is made in
Somerville, Toward a Consistent Definition of Freedom, in NoMos, supra note
9 at 300.
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ment would be relevant to the term liberty while another
would not. Instead, all types and degrees of constraint are potentially relevant to the concept of liberty, depending on the
circumstance. Those "circumstances," however, arise directly
from the definitional elements of the distinctiveness and
meaningfulness of alternatives available to the individual
agent. That is, a constraint on an agent's range of choices,
whether imposed by threat of physical harm, high monetary
cost, or moral suasion, amounts to an interference with the
liberty of that agent if the constraint has an impact on the
distinctiveness or meaningfulness of the remaining options.
Thus, to the person with malfunctioning kidneys who faces a
choice between surgery and death, the fact that the surgery is
made unavailable by either high cost or political favoritism to
others makes that constraint a reduction in her liberty. 9 On
the other hand, a constraint that removes one among a significant array of alternative actions available to the agent
would not, by itself, constitute an infringement of the agent's
liberty. Thus, the choices that an agent faces can be restricted by a broad range of moral arguments that he accepts
or by the prohibitive costs of various alternatives, without
moving the agent from the central case of liberty. It also follows that a large number of constraints imposed by government might have no material impact by themselves on the
distinctiveness or meaningfulness of the options available to
the agent, and therefore not reduce the liberty of the agent.
I shall further develop this difficult and controversial point in
a subsequent section.60
Finally, in addition to focusing on constraints imposed by
humans, as opposed to those imposed by the circumstances or
the tastes of the agent, my definition of liberty also specifies
that the person causing the constraint be someone other than
the agent himself. If an individual's liberty has been impinged, if his range of options has been diminished in some
significant respect, then that reduction must not be attributable to past choices by the agent. In other words, the exercise
of one's own liberty can never, by itself, be said to infringe
one's liberty.
This concept, however, may present a tracing problem.
Once an agent selects a particular action, he will find himself
in a new state of affairs calling for new decisions. These new
59.

This particular sort of medical dilemma is the special focus of G.
P. BoBBrrr, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978).
See infra pp. 587-593.

CALABRESI AND

60.
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circumstances may introduce new considerations and slightly
varied options that are the result of the actions of persons
other than the agent. As this process is repeated, it becomes
extremely difficult to trace the agent's present set of diminished alternatives to his "initial" decision that began the
chain of events."' This notion of historical pedigree is another variable in the liberty matrix that works in a very complicated fashion.
Since our definition of liberty does not include constraints caused by the agent himself, an agent who finds himself presently constrained by his own past deeds is still otherwise at the central case of liberty. At the opposite extreme,
an agent presently constrained only by the actions of other
persons has clearly suffered a loss of liberty, provided the
other elements of the definition are met (for example, the
nonharm criterion). This leaves a vast middle ground where
present constraints are the product of both the agent's past
decisions and the actions of others. Determining whether any
particular instance falls inside or outside the liberty set, and if
inside, how far, will then depend on the relative weight assigned to each of these factors and their ratio. In the best of
circumstances, such a task would be formidable indeed, for
the assignment of weights and the assessment of the relationship between these factors may well be more a matter of normative judgment than of scientific method.62
II.

LIBERTY AND LAW

Dividing the concept of liberty into its separate constituent elements now makes possible a more exacting and more
profitable examination of the meaning and importance of lib61. See e.g., MacCormick, supra note 48, at 248:
If we believe in human agency at all, we must believe in a difference between my causing a state of affairs S and my causing a
prior state of affairs in which another agent has some opportunity,
temptation, ground or means to bring about S. That other agent
causes S, and I don't cause it even though he would not have done
so but for the opportunity, temptation, ground, means or
whatever furnished by me. Opportunities may be necessary for
thefts, but exceptional cases of compulsive behavior apart, they do
not necessitate people to steal. I don't cause the theft of my briefcase by leaving it in an unlocked car; and that is true even though
my loss of it by theft in such a case may be my own fault.
See also HL.A. HART & A. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 69-70, 94
(1959), and A. DONAGAN, THE THEORY OF MORALITY 42-46 (1977).
62. See notes 12-20, supra.
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erty within the institution of law, and more particularly
within constitutional law. Again, the proper method is to take
discrete successive steps. I begin by developing the relationship of liberty to the equally complex philosophical notion of
"rights." From that basis, the connection of the concepts of
liberty and property is more easily discernible. The discussion
then leads naturally to an examination of the textual appearance of the term liberty within the Constitution, specifically,
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
A.

Liberty and Rights

In developing the focal meaning of liberty I have limited
the discussion to those circumstances in which an agent could
be said to be "at liberty." I have avoided as much as possible
reference to "rights," although the concept of liberty naturally implies some connection with this special type of claim. I
have made this separation in order to focus more distinctly
on the concept of a "right" and to demonstrate the new elements it introduces into an analysis of liberty.
The key additional factor that the subject of rights"s in63. The concept of a right is multifaceted in much the same way
liberty is, and we can demonstrate this by stating the general form of a
right in terms of several variables (borrowing in part from A. GEWIRTH,
REASON AND MORALITY 65 (1978): "A has a type-Z right, of stringency-S, to
X against B in context C by virtue of Y." The seven elements of a right are
therefore these:
(1) the subject or holder of the right-our agent "A";
(2) the modality or form of the right-"type Z": for example, "legal" or
"moral" or "prudential";
(3) the stringency or strength of the right-"S"-which includes conceptual characteristics such as "absolute," "prima facie," and "inalienable";
(4) the object of the right-"X"-which can be in the nature of an action
(to do X) or access to something more tangible (to have X), and which can
be either general or specific;
(5) the respondent to the right-"B"-who can be an individual or any
collectivity of persons, and who thereby has a corresponding "duty" not to
interfere with the right, and who can have this duty either directly by owing something to A or indirectly (or derivatively) by guaranteeing to A the
enjoyment of some right;
(6) the domain of life in which the right is asserted-"context C": i.e., "social" right, "political" right, "economic" right; and
(7) the justifying reason or normative foundation for the right-"Y."
The concepts of liberty and rights can be related in two seemingly different ways. One is the common reference to a "right to liberty" (see, e.g., R.
DWORKIN,TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 266 (1978)) where liberty is simply inserted as the object of the right in element (4). That leaves open, however,
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troduces into an analysis of liberty is the fact of institutional
involvement in the formation, implementation, and protection of sets of choices indicative of liberty. The institution
usually associated with these "rights-functions" is, of course,
the state, which, through its law-making authority, can create
"legal" rights in the positivist" sense. Other institutions,
however, can generate, protect, and delimit ranges of choice
within their own spheres of influence, including the marketplace, religious organizations, the family, and so on. Some of
these options may also be protected by the state and therefore called "legal" rights, but the concept of liberty is not
inherently limited to this topic alone. One cannot understand
or appreciate this particular portion of the concept of liberty
in isolation. One can place these legal rights to various options in proper context by returning to the definitional technique I have been employing.
The central case of a "right to liberty," or the set of
rights at the core of liberty, would be a situation in which the
elements characteristic of the central case of liberty are given
the greatest possible degree of protection that the resources
of the state could offer. In other words, the central case of a
"right to liberty" exists where the counter-incentives to those
who might ignore their duties and interfere with one's liberty
are at a maximum. The most obvious example of such
counter-incentives or "costs" are the penalties of the criminal
law, the most extreme being the death penalty. Thus, the
true central case of "legal" liberty would be a choice-set with
all the characteristics described earlier and which is protected
by the death penalty. We then move from the central case of
liberty by decreasing the amount of protection given any set
of choices, moving through varying levels of criminal penalty
and then into varying types and levels of civil damages one
might recover. At some point the courts will not enforce our
the question of the sense of "right" being used in any given context and
requires some analysis of that concept. The other is the equally common
assertion that "liberty is a set of rights." Id. at 272-278. Here the concept
of rights is a primary focus, but the question now becomes which rights
constitute liberty. Thus, either arrangement inevitably requires attention
to both concepts and inevitably results in the same analysis.
64. "Legal positivism" is a phrase fraught with ambiguity, but it
connotes at minimum the idea that the term "law" is reserved for those
forms of social control that are evidenced in "positive" or observable
sources. See generally Hart, Legal Positivism, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSoPHv 418-20 (1967). Another more controversial description of the basic
tenets of positivism appears in R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 17
(1978). See also J. RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 37-77 (1979).
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rights-claims, and the notion that we have a "legal" right will
fade. If, however, some residual level of counter-incentive to
the would-be interferor remains, such as the fear of ostracism
or scorn by others in one's community, family, or profession,
there may be some conventional "moral" sense of a right to
the choices involved.15 Again, the level of protection necessary for any of these peripheral situations to remain in the
"liberty" set is difficult to specify.
The analysis of requisite levels of protection reveals an
interesting relationship. The most extreme counter-incentive
to interfere with others' liberty, the death penalty, is generally limited to situations of the most extreme deprivation of
choice-sets, intentional murder, where no choices of any kind
remain available to the victim. At the other end of the spectrum, actual interference with our choices is condoned in
very particular situations involving very specific options, such
as the choice to drive on a particular side of the road. This
suggests a relationship between the level of protection afforded choices and the generality of the unencumbered
choices that the agent seeks to make: The more general the
right claimed, the more protection afforded it. For example,
the right of free speech is seen as inviolable, while the right
to speak at a particular place at a particular time is subject to
much regulation.6" Each "general" right, however, will ultimately consist of a set of more discrete, specific claims of
right. Thus, the more these specific rights are circumscribed,
the more one can question the actual existence of the foundational general rights,67 and in turn the existence of liberty itself
in its deepest sense.
B.

Liberty and Property

As a transitional step between the descriptive analysis of
65. H.L.A. Hart, for example, has noted that one distinction between law and morality is the "characteristic form of. . . pressure which is
exerted in . . . support" of moral rules. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW
175 (1961).
66. The most common of such restrictions are various "time, place,
and manner" limitations on the exercise of freedom of speech in specific
contexts. See, e.g., Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 398 (1953);
Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293-94 (1951); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U.S. 77, 82 (1949); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575-76 (1941).
67. This observation also relates to the earlier discussion in note 41,
supra, of the level of externality associated with the exercise of liberty.
While few external "costs" are associated with general rights, extensive
costs are often recognized regarding specific activities.
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liberty and a consideration of liberty as a political issue in its
constitutional context, the relationship between liberty and
property should be examined briefly. To do so, the full definitional detail of the social institution of property need not
be developed, as that has been done elsewhere. 6s I shall simply draw upon that work to note some general but important
linkages between these two fundamental legal concepts.
Property rights are rights of ownership, and the concept
of ownership requires two primary features: (1) rights of control (2) over identifiable "things." 9 The first feature confirms the inevitable overlap between property and liberty, for
both consist of sets of rights. Property rights, however, are a
unique sub-set of rights because of the second feature: they
all share the characteristic of being associated with ownable
objects of some sort, whether tangible or intangible. 70 Liberties, on the other hand, are rights not necessarily associated
with particular items or specific past events. In their general
form, they are free-floating claims to non-interference. For
example, the right to sell one's home is a property right,
while the right to sell in general, the right to become a participant in private market transactions, is an aspect of our liberty. Of course, the debate concerning the nature of this
"thingness" feature of property, and hence the controversy
surrounding the nature and location of the precise dividing
line between property and liberty interests, is difficult to resolve. 1 Nevertheless, property rights are inevitably derivative
68. See Property,Due Process, supra note 14, at 868-874 and material
cited therein.
69. Id. at 869-870. This is in fact a very summary description of
these elements. The "rights of control" associated with the central case of
ownership also includes limitations on these rights (id.), just as the central
case of liberty has inherent limitations on the agent's range of alternatives.
Similarly, the requirement for "identifiable things" is a common shorthand
reference to the more fundamental conceptual requirement for "specificity" in the claim of ownership. See infra note 70.
Two additional features not directly relevant to our present inquiry are
(1) the existence of special limitations on a property owner's rights concerning certain individuals in certain circumstances-e.g., easements, and
(2) a "social context" dimension, or specific reference to the era or culture
in which the concept is being examined. See id.at 870-873.
70. The variety of things to which claims of ownership can be made
are listed in id. at 870 n. 34 (quoting Honore, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS
IN JURISPRUDENCE 107, 132 (A. Guest ed. 1961)).
71. A very interesting current debate concerning precisely this issue, although it is not labeled in this fashion, is one involving the inheritability of a deceased celebrity's "right of publicity." The question, in essence, is whether this right is a property interest, for if it is, then it should
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in character, depending upon the prior existence of more
general rights concerning choice sets themselves, or liberties.
Correspondingly, these liberties need not be "owned" in order to be viable: they can and do exist independently of, and
even in the absence of, any particular scheme of private
property 72
C.

Liberty and Due Process

The substance of both "liberty" and "property" in the
context of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments has been a subject of continuing controversy. 7 Rather than attempt to review and assess the full
range of this constitutional debate,7 4 I will concentrate on a
recent topic involving the relationship of individuals to the
state that has prompted a number of articles,7 5 including an
have the full panoply of ownership-related rights associated with it, including the right to pass the interest on to one's heirs. One basic problem with
this reasoning, however, is the issue of whether the celebrity's fame is actually a "thing" that the celebrity "owned" that he could pass on to others.
The courts have not been unanimous on this point. See, e.g., Factors Etc.,
Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978); Memphis Development
Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc., 578 F.2d 1381 (6th Cir. 1978); Martin
Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage
Products, Inc., 250 Ga. 135, 296 S.E.2d 697 (1982); and Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal.3d 813, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 603 P.2d 425 (1979).
72. This conceptual separation of property and liberty also seems to
be at the root of an important legal distinction often associated with them.
One consistent characteristic of interests labeled "liberties" is not only
their personal nature, but also a corresponding lack of a critical "property"
element: alienability, or the right to sell the interest. However, some liberties do appear to be alienable, or at least contractually waivable, in many
situations, and the true distinction between interests that are sellable and
those that are not, regardless of their conceptual label as property or liberty, may be based upon the analysis of inalienable interests presented in
Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106-1115 (1972). The authors argued that rules prohibiting market exchanges are based primarily
on the incommensurability of some of the values considered to be at stake
in the transaction. Such may well be the case regarding the sale of our
freedoms, particularly those that are general and basic.
73. See Property, Due Process, supra note 14, at 864 n. 15.
74. 1 noted earlier one potential item of trouble that is in fact more
a product of linguistic misconception than anything else-the "liberty-license" dichotomy.
75. See, e.g., Property, Due Process, supra note 14; Williams, Liberty
and Property: The Problem of Government Benefits, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 3 (1983);
Smolla, The Reemergence of the Right- Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law: The Price of Protesting Too Much, 35 STAN. L. REV. 69 (1982); Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property":Adjudicative Due Process in the Adminis-
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oft-cited one by Professor Henry Monaghan7 1 upon which I
can conveniently focus.
Monaghan criticized the (then) newest mutation in a series of Supreme Court cases which had narrowed the meanings of both "liberty" and "property" through a single consistent theme: no constitutional deprivation of these interests
would be found unless the government action infringed some
interest that had been previously created, protected, or recognized by the government.7 7 That theme, according to
Monaghan, seemed to drain the concepts of liberty and property of any independent constitutional substance, and to leave
them to the mercy of the states.7
In a previous article, I have challenged this criticism of
the Court's reasoning, at least insofar as property interests
are concerned. 9 Professor Monaghan's pessimism could be
largely alleviated, I argued, by recognizing a deep theory of
the Due Process Clause itself: that it is a device for restoring
equilibrium to the relationship between the individual and
the state.80 The power of the state to interfere in the life of
the individual is countered by the individual's right to demand procedural regularity by the state. But what process is
"due" will therefore be a matter of circumstance: The Constitution will require those particular procedures that will restore and maintain a protective balance against overly intrusive or arbitrary state action.81
"Arbitrariness" itself is by the same token a matter of
circumstance. According to the above theory, devices other
than the Due Process Clause are available for maintaining
this equilibrium, such as individual choice, one of the central
elements being investigated in this essay. As a consequence,
"legal" protection of the individual in his dealings with government is far less necessary where the individual may choose
initially to avoid rather than encounter the state. In this situation, if the individual chooses to deal with government instead of some private alternative, government may impose as
many procedural "holes" in the interests it makes available as
trative State, 62
76.
(1977).
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

CORNELL L. REV. 445 (1977).
Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62

Monaghan, supra note 74, at 420-429.
Id. at 424-25.
Property, Due Process, supra note 14.
Id. at 901-903.
Id. at 904-05.
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the market will allow.82 On the other hand, where the individual does not have a choice, where the state is effectively a
"monopolist" concerning some interest, the Due Process
Clause is applicable and prevents the state from attempting to
impose procedural limitations to its advantage."3
This approach to the Due Process Clause, coupled with
my previous definitional development of the concept of liberty, suggests that Professor Monaghan's analysis of the
Court's handling of liberty is also too pessimistic. He initially
expressed consternation over the expansion of the substance
of liberty from its original meaning of "freedom from personal restraint." ' 4 But I delay my concern with that particular point until the next section. For now, I accept, as he does,
the broad sense in which8 5the term liberty now seems to be
understood by the courts.
Monaghan began his criticism of the gradual narrowing
process to which "liberty" has been subjected over the last
decade with Board of Regents v. Roth.8 6 Roth involved an assistant professor at a state university who was not rehired at the
end of his one-year contract. He claimed the decision not to
rehire him, having been reached without affording him notice or a prior hearing, was a deprivation of his liberty and
property interests without due process of law. 8 7 Although the
82. Id.
83. Id. at 905-911.
84. Monaghan, supra note 74, at 411-416.
85. At one point he concludes:
How can this extension [of the concept of liberty] be justified as a
legitimate mode of constitutional interpretation? I do not know.
But, like others, I must accept reality: this judicial expansion of
"liberty" is now far too central a part of our constitutional order
to admit of reassessment. Indeed, loosened from the fetters of
original intent and fortified by judicial precedent, I readily accept
[Board of Regents v. Roth's proposition that "[i]n a Constitution for
a free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of 'liberty'
must be broad indeed."
Id. at 416, quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972).
86. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
87. Wisconsin State University-Oshkosh hired David Roth for a
fixed term of one academic year. Id. at 566. At the end of the fixed term,
the university advised Roth that he would not be rehired for the next academic year. Id. Because Roth was not tenured, state law left the rehiring
decision to the unfettered discretion of university officials. Id. at 567.
Under Board of Regents rules, the university officials did not have to give
Roth the reasons for their decision not to rehire him, or to provide him
with the opportunity for an appeal or a review of the decision. Id. Thus,
Roth received only a timely notice informing him that he would not be
rehired without specifying the reasons. Roth then filed suit in federal court
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property issue is not our direct concern here, the Court's
analysis of this point is relevant to my theory of the Due Process Clause, and hence to the concept of liberty. The Court
decided the point on the basis of Professor Roth's employment contract: it was only a one-year arrangement; consequently, the decision not to rehire him had not infringed any
contractual and, therefore, property interest possessed by
Professor Roth. 88 Since no property interest was implicated,
the question of what process he might be due never arose.
Professor Monaghan criticized this reasoning for conflating procedural and substantive issues, thereby permitting
procedural limitations to escape judicial scrutiny because of a
prior substantive decision on the nature of what constitutes a
constitutional property interest.8 9 The "balance" or "monopolist" theory of the Due Process Clause which I developed
above, however, suggests a rather different point of view.
Professor Roth could by his own decision accept whatever
limited forms of "property" that the government chose to offer, provided his choice was "meaningful" in the sense that
government was not effectively in the position of a "monopolist." Since government did not enjoy a monopolistic advantage over Professor Roth when he accepted the job, he had
no basis for later complaint concerning the administrative details of that job.
A similar conclusion concerning an additional basis for
Roth's "liberty" claim is also prompted. He had argued that
his reputation constituted a liberty interest, and that the university's failure to rehire him had infringed that interest.
The Supreme Court rejected this idea, despite the fact that it
reiterated the notion that "[i]n a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of 'liberty' must
be broad indeed."9 0 The Court based its negative conclusion
on the element of "choice" described above, although the
Court did not articulate this point in quite the detail suggested by the analytic framework I have developed here. The
Court stated more simply that "[ilt stretches the concept too
far to suggest that a person is deprived of 'liberty' when he
alleging that the decision violated his fourteenth amendment due process
right because it gave no reasons and provided no opportunity for a hearing. Id. at 569. Roth also alleged that the decision was motivated by a number of unpopular statements he had made and therefore violated his first
amendment rights. Id. at 568.
88. Id. at 578-79.
89. Monaghan, supra note 74, at 438.
90. 408 U.S. at 572.
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simply is not rehired in one job but remains as free as before
to seek another."9' 1 Again, while Professor Monaghan criticized this result, I do not share his concern, for it seems to be
quite consistent with the definitional element of "meaningfulness" within liberty. That is, where government is not in the
position of a monopolist, it is reasonable to conclude that
while the array of options faced by someone who is not rehired at the end of his contract is not as rich in number as it
was before, the array nevertheless still contains enough options to be meaningful. Therefore, "liberty," properly understood, has not been infringed. Moreover, one could view the
lack of government monopoly as meaning that Professor
Roth placed himself in this predicament by his own previous
choices, again suggesting that his liberty, properly understood, had not been diminished by the university's actions
under the existing contract, but rather, by his own actions.
This final point may be an important factor in explaining
another decision contemporary with Roth that also troubled
Professor Monaghan. As he stated the issue:
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, following the Roth caveat, held
the due process clause to be applicable to a civil service regulation barring aliens from access to a class of public employment. Unfortunately, the Court has not adequately explained why the discharge of a specific public employee
does not activate the due process clause, while "a rule
which deprives a discrete class of persons of an interest in
liberty on a wholesale basis" does. One is tempted to say
that the liberty protected by due process operates only at
wholesale, not retail. 9
One need not be pushed to this conclusion at all, however. If
the state university system involved in Roth had announced
that no professors whose contracts were coming to an end at
the close of the academic year were to be rehired, there
would have been no more infringement of liberty than there
had been in Roth itself. State actions aimed at aggregate or
class interests are more properly addressed under the Equal
Protection Clause, which Professor Monaghan discussed in a
very nice summary analysis elsewhere in his article.9 3 Perhaps
that would have been a better route for the Supreme Court
91.
92.

Id. at 575.
Monaghan, supra note 74, at 422, quoting Hampton v. Mow

Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1976).
93.

Id. at 416-420.
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to have taken in Mow Sun Wong. But insofar as the concept of
liberty is concerned, one major difference between Mow Sun
Wong and Roth is that in the former the claimant had never
previously agreed to, or conducted himself in such a way as
ultimately to come within the range of, the government restrictions on employment. The claimant's status as an alien
was not something associated with his previous choices.
Rather, government simply removed an option from the
aliens' pre-existing choice-set.
Under a proper analysis, these constraints would infringe
the liberty of this group only after additional elements had
been considered. Most importantly, in the context of these
cases, one must examine the definitional requirement that
the restriction on choices impact the distinctiveness or meaningfulness of the remaining options available to the claimant.
In Mow Sun Wong this would seem somewhat problematic,
since many other employment options remained available to
aliens despite the restrictions on public service employment.
The Court's decision thus suggests several possibilities. Perhaps the Court sensed a significant amount of impact on the
"meaningfulness" of the aliens' choices not because the restriction was imposed in an aggregate fashion, but because it
was "general" rather than "specific" in character.94 Another
possibility is that this general sort of restriction, coupled with
its class-based character, simply ran afoul of a standard equal
protection analysis, as mentioned earlier, which the Court
mislabeled." The most likely possibility is that the decision
reflected some normative theory underlying the Court's sense
of liberty, rather than any aspects of the exact definition of
this concept. Perhaps the Court simply followed the suggestion of Ronald Dworkin that liberty be viewed as a subset of
the more basic value of "equality," or more accurately,
"equal concern and respect," 96 and that the government's
treatment of this disenfranchised group seemed reprehensible on this basis. Whatever the key to unlocking Mow Sun
Wong, it is clear that an understanding of the definitional detail of the concept of liberty, and of the distinction between
its description and its normative justification, leave a great
deal more to be said about the case than Professor Monaghan
expressed in his article.
Such explanations are of little assistance, however, re94.

See pp. 557-558, supra.

96.

R.

95. See p. 34, supra, and note 93, supra.
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY

198, 272-73 (1978).
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garding Paul v. Davis,97 decided four years after Roth and
Mow Sun Wong. Paul involved an individual, as in Roth, and a
nonconsentual interaction between that individual and the
state, as in Mow Sun Wong. The claimant alleged a denial of
liberty without due process when police sent a circular to local merchants containing his picture and a description of him
as an "active shoplifter." 98 He claimed that the defamation
infringed his liberty interests and that it had been done in
the absence of either prior notice or a hearing on the allegation. 99 The Supreme Court, however, found that no constitutional liberty was involved. The most fundamental policy reason for its conclusion was the desire to keep tort litigation of
this sort from flooding the federal courts. 0 0 To avoid raising
this state action to the level of a violation of the Constitution,
the Court employed reasoning similar to that used in Roth.
No liberty interest was infringed because the claimant could
not show any interference with a specific constitutional guarantee, freedom of speech, or with some "more tangible" interest already created by state law. 10' As an example of the
02
latter, the Court distinguished Wisconsin v. Constantineau'
because the claimant in that case had not only been in some
general sense "defamed" but had also lost the right to buy
alcoholic beverages. 0 3 Thus, Paul required a preexisting legal, public or state-related "choice" in order for the claimant
to establish an infringement of liberty. The claimant, however, could show no such disability: "The plaintiff. . . could
vote, drive his vehicle, and buy liquor-all just as before the
defamatory act." ' 4
From the point of view of the concept of liberty there
are several difficulties with this .reasoning. Any comparison of
Roth and Paul would involve a serious conceptual error, for
the critical element in Roth was the individual's choice to deal
with the state, and his acceptance of an interest that was limited. As Justice Rehnquist stated in another case, the individual took "the bitter with the sweet."' 0 Therefore, the individual's "liberty" interest in this context was also inherently
97.

98.

424 U.S. 693, rehearing denied, 425 U.S. 985 (1976).

424 U.S. at 695.

99.
100.
101.

Id. at 697.
See Property, Due Process, supra note 14, at 884.
424 U.S. at 709.

102.
103.

400 U.S. 433 (1971), distinguished in Paul, 424 U.S. at 707.
400 U.S. at 434 n. 2.

104.
105.

Monaghan, supra note 74, at 425.
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 154 (1974).
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limited, since the individual's prior choice had placed him in
a predicament where the state could act just as it did. Actionable "defamation," on the other hand would be much more
difficult to demonstrate. In Paul, since a prior individual
choice was not available to limit the sense of liberty involved,
the Court developed an alternative to accomplish the same
thing. It declared in effect that "liberty" in its constitutional
context involves only those choices directly created, sanctioned, or related to the state. The fact that the claimant
might lose his job, be kicked out of civic organizations or
clubs, or be ostracized by members of his family, all of which
create impacts on the "choices" available to the claimant
across the spectrum of his life activities, would not seem to be
relevant. From a definitional point of view, however, such a
result is indefensible. Just as the concept of property in the
context of the Constitution is not limited to state-related largess,1 0 6 the concept of liberty should also not be limited to
state-related choices of actions. If liberty is truly a more general "right to develop" or "right to pursue one's own lifeplan," then there can be no doubt that the state's action in
Paul infringed it.
This conclusion, however, leads us back into the quandary the Court had been trying to avoid. With this expansive
definition of liberty, all state action would seem to establish a
federal cause of action. Yet this inference is premature. The
only point established thus far is that the concept of liberty
cannot be narrowed to reach this result the way the property
interest in Roth had been legitimately limited. While liberty
may have been infringed, the degree of that interference and
its relationship to the requirement of due process have yet to
be investigated. Thus, in Paul, rather than stopping prematurely at the issue of liberty, the Court should have considered the subsequent, but no less constitutionally critical, matter of the demands of due process. This raises an entire
range of separate considerations primarily revolving around
preventing potential abuses of governmental power,"0 7 most
of which are clearly beyond the scope of this essay. But in at
least one important respect the concept of liberty I have
painstakingly developed could be of great assistance in the
analysis of this issue as well.
Further analysis of Supreme Court decisions could reveal
that the "amount" of procedural protection demanded by
106.
107.

See Property, Due Process, supra note 14, at 896 n. 201.
Id. at 936-40.
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the Constitution is related directly to the "distance" the
state's action had moved the individual from the central case
of liberty.1 0 8 For example, assuming that in Paul the claimant
had been at the central case before the state acted, the degree of process to which he would be entitled would be established by examining how serious the impact had been on the
"meaningfulness" of his remaining choices. Indeed, the Supreme Court implicitly used this technique by carefully noting the wide range of "official" options that had not been disturbed by the distribution of the circular. 9 Thus, an
alternative ground for the decision could have been that
while the claimant's liberty may have been infringed, the impact was sufficiently small that due process did not demand a
prior hearing. Perhaps all that would be necessary would be
state causes of action in tort against the government.1 10 Indeed, this reasoning more satisfactorily explains another decision contemporary with Paul that Professor Monaghan also
finds disturbing for its use of the Paul rationale. In Meachum
v. Fano'" a state prisoner challenged the constitutionality of
the procedures involved in his transfer from one state institution to a more restrictive one. There was no need for the
Court to have been concerned, as it was, about the absence of
an allegation that some specific constitutional right or statecreated liberty interest had been violated. '2 Instead, the
Court could have focused on the extremely peripheral sense
of "liberty" that the prisoner enjoyed before the transfer, implicitly suggesting that the move from this circumstance to
one somewhat further from the central case would require a
degree of procedural protection to
correspondingly minimal
1
be constitutional. i
108. This was the relationship between due process and the concept
of property suggested in id. at 938-40.
109. 424 U.S. at 711-12.
110. This indeed was the Court's conclusion. Id. at 712.
111. 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
112. Id. at 216, 228.
113. This is essentially the conclusion reached by Justice Stevens in
dissent in Meachum. 427 U.S. at 229. However, this is in fact a larger and
more significant point than the context of the present discussion otherwise
indicates, for itrelates to the point to be developed in the next section.
Justice Stevens chided the majority for its positivist, and rather cavalier,
attitude toward the concept of liberty. By focusing that concept on staterelated or -guaranteed "rights," the majority had lost sight of the fundamental constitutional proposition that "all men [are] endowed by their Creator with liberty as one of the cardinal unalienable rights" and that "the
Due Process Clause protects" those sorts of rights rather "than the particu-
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III. LIBERTY IN THE REGULATED STATE: THE
CENTRALIZATION AND POLITICIZATION OF LIBERTY
This analysis of the modern constitutional meaning of
the term liberty in the Due Process Clause returns us to some
fundamental political and philosophical issues that must at
least be faced, if not resolved, in this short essay. If a sense of
balance between government and the individual is the key
policy foundation of the Due Process Clause, then there is
every reason to expect and endorse changes in the concept of
liberty over time, rather than to have nagging doubts about
them as Professor Monaghan expressed. For if government
grows in power and pervasiveness, then liberty must also expand to meet the challenge and restore the mystical equilibrium. Moreover, if this general description of the relationship between liberty and governmental power is accurate,
then one might intuit that over the span of our country's history, the ratio of these two factors may have remained relatively constant.
This apparent maintenance of equipoise, however, is not
necessarily benign. For example, it seems to have caused
John Hart Ely to rewrite portions of American constitutional
history. In Democracy and Distrust"" he asserts at one point
that "[p]opular control and egalitarianism are surely both ancient American ideals."' 1 5 He elaborates on them in the following representative passages. Concerning egalitarianism, he
states:
When it came to describing the actual mechanics of republican government in the Constitution, however, this concern
for equality got comparatively little explicit attention . . .
because of an assumption of "pure" republican political and
social theory . . . that "the people" were an essentially homogeneous group whose interests did not vary
lar rights or privileges conferred by special laws or regulations." Id. at 230.
The majority's attitude, then, is simply another symptom of the centralization and politicization of the concept of liberty discussed in Part III of this
essay, infra.
I should also note that for purposes of simplicity of discussion, the analysis of cases in the text is limited to those considered by Professor
Monaghan in his article. There have, of course, been more decisions since
Meachum, and two of the most important-Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480
(1980), and Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14 (1981)-are discussed at
length in Property, Due Process, supra note 14, at 934 n. 378.
.114. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1980).
115. Id. at 76.
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significantly.' 1 6
And concerning popular control and its connection with the
concept of liberty, he notes:
[O]ur Constitution has always been substantially concerned
with preserving liberty . . . by a quite extensive set of procedural protections, and by . . . ensuring that . . . the decision process will be open to all on something approaching
an equal basis . . . . The general strategy has therefore
not been to root in the document a set of substantive rights
entitled to permanent protection. 1
These observations are reasonable only if one ignores two
critical historical facts: first, that the original ,Constitution
strove to insulate federal officials from direct popular control; 1 8 second, that liberty was preserved in that document
not simply by procedural protections and a few substantive
rights, but by substantive limitations on the range of activities
available to the federal government. 9 These two facts suggest some rather different conclusions concerning the notions
of equality and sovereignty, and hence liberty, that may have
underlay the Constitution at its origin.
The fact that the Constitution did not create a central
government of vast and pervasive powers reflects an assumption of homogeneity in the American populace (the white
populace, that is). The assumption of homogeneity did not
involve general substantive interests, but a specific shared
love of freedom from government interference. We were all
to enjoy an "equality of liberty." This was only possible, however, in the context of a central government that was primarily conceived with the broad and largely uncontroversial authority of a "night watchman," rather than with the
authority to impose fundamental social change. Such limited
dominion over our options would not challenge the substantive interest of social heterogeneity that the Framers knew
quite well characterized the American populace. Moreover,
the Constitution left intact the system of state and local government where regional diversity was expected not only to
survive but to thrive.
116. Id. at 79.
117. Id. at 100.
118. See text accompanying notes 120-123, infra.
119. The best recent article to make this point forcefully is Mayton,
Seditious Libel and the Lost Guaranteeof a Freedom of Expression, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 91 (1984).
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Regarding the relative lack of popular control that characterized the original federal government, substantive egalitarianism was not of deep concern to the Framers. Instead, it
seemed reasonable to have a severely restricted electorate select only one half of Congress by direct balloting,1 20 and the
other halp 2 and the President1 22 by indirect methods, and
the federal judiciary not at all.12 The powers of this government were thought sufficiently restricted that those with suffrage rights were primarily those most likely to be impacted
significantly by its activities.
While Professor Ely's sense of the importance of process,
enfranchisement, and representation may be historically questionable, it is nevertheless currently rather accurate. This is
not necessarily a good sign, however, for he accepts rather
uncritically the potential implications of an extremely broadbased and active electorate. The fact that a minority of eligible and registered voters in this country often chooses various officials at all levels of government could be something to
be proud of, not decried, as Seymour Martin Lipset suggested almost a quarter century ago:
Although the kinds and causes of apathy and nonvoting
vary for different historical periods and for different sections of the population, it is possible that nonvoting is now,
at least in the Western democracies, a reflection of the stability of the system, a response to the decline of major social conflicts, and an increase in cross-pressures,
particularly
124
those affecting the working class.
Lipset could add, as he does later, that voting rates are low
when a group perceives that "its ' interests
are [not] strongly
25
affected by government policies.'
Thus, increased concern with enfranchisement and political representation which Professor Ely details 1 28 is in fact a
symptom of the release of government from its early constitutional fetters, a deeper and prior political phenomenon.
With government now able to involve itself in all aspects of
120. U.S. CONST. art. I, §2, cl. 1.
121. U.S. CONST.art. I, §3, cl. I (Senators chosen by state legislatures).
122. U.S. CONST. art. II, §1, cl. 3 (President chosen by Electors).
123. U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl. 2 (Judges appointed by the President,
with the advice and consent of the senate).
124. S.LiPSET, POLITICAL MAN: THE SOCIAL BASES OF POLITICS 181
(1960).
125. Id. at 186.
126. ELY, supra note 114, at 94-100.
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our lives, our only protection lies in emphasizing a correspondingly broad range of individual rights that serve to
"trump" intended majoritarian action."2 7 But even more ominously, the breadth of government activity means not only
128
that it is a source of danger, but of advantage as well.
Thus, the political process, the "legal" creation and protection of individual prerogatives, is now of the most vital concern 2 9 and has replaced other social institutions, such as the
market, our more immediate communities, our families, and
even ourselves, 180 as the first and last word on the substance
127. Ronald Dworkin is the most famous advocate of this idea of understanding rights as "trumping" utilitarian social policies. See, e.g., R.
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 190 (1978):
The claim that citizens have a right to free speech must imply that
it would be wrong for the Government to stop them from speaking, even when the Government believes that what they will say
will cause more harm than good.
128. This is one of the points made by Charles Reich in his famous
article The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 764-768 (1964).
129. Gerald Sirkin has a particularly pessimistic point of view on this
point:
Still another change in the political process occurs because of
changes in voter thinking and strategy. As government expands its
activities, new vistas open up to voters. Demands for government
interventions or special benefits, which were unthinkable under
the rules of the individualistic game, now become thinkable. Each
new government action whets the appetite for more. Those who
bear the cost of government think less about ways to restrain government spending and more about ways to achieve partial recompense through some special benefits for themselves. The competition for a share of the loot speeds up the growth of government
and weakens confidence in democracy as a workable method of
government.
Under the strain of the expanding role of government, the democratic method will eventually break down. The transfer of power
from politicians to the bureaucracy and the scramble for government benefits will contribute to the breakdown. If democracy
should survive those stresses, it will eventually face a more severe
test. In countries where government dominates the economy and
is the principal source of privileges, rewards, and even livelihood,
control of government is not something to be lightly risked. Free
elections are not a menace to those in power when government is
unimportant and not much is at stake. But when government becomes a vital concern of those in power, we can expect to see, as
we have seen in so many failed democracies, a military takeover or
a declaration of "emergency" with suspension of elections or the
establishment of a one-party system by the suppression of
opposition.
Sirkin, supra note 56, at 190.
130. Although Sirkin seems to focus on the individual, in the context
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of the concept of liberty.
This, then, is a "new liberty" that complements the
"new property" that Charles Reich identified in his famous
article two decades ago.13 1 Just as Reich's property was government-related, consisting of various forms of largess such
as licenses, subsidies, and welfare payments, 3 ' so too our new
liberty is a centralized and politicized concept. 3 Again, one
of his article it is clear that he is concerned with the loss of the sense of
community as well. See Sirkin, supra note 56 at 183-184. See also Lasch, The
Bill of Rights and the Therapeutic State, in THE FUTURE OF OUR LIBERTIES 195
(S. Halpern ed. 1982).
This dominance of the state in fact reinforces my earlier conclusion that
liberty and license must be distinguished. That is, I noted in Part II that
liberty as it is normally understood, certainly in legal contexts, is composed
of a set of rights, and I observe in the present Part that to be a "right" that
counts, the claim must be one that is recognized by the state. Thus, since
there is no recognized "right" of this sort to punch someone in the nose,
this particular activity would not be properly included in the "liberty" set.
Hence, liberty comes to be understood as that set of alternative actions
which one has a "right" to perform, and "license" describes those activities
which one does not have such a right to perform. This reasoning is troublesome, of course, because it leaves "rights" and hence liberty, totally at
the mercy of the state. But if the depiction of the present state of affairs
suggested in the text is moderately accurate, this indeed is the situation we
face. A positivist sense of rights and a state-related concept of liberty are
now our controlling perspectives. There is certainly plenty of evidence to
support this conclusion, not the least of which is John Hart Ely's purely
procedural view of the content of the Constitution. ELY, supra note 114.
Recall also Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' approach to this matter, noted
in Part I of this essay, supra at p. 13. See also Donaldson, Regulation of Conduct in Relation to Land-The Need to Purge Natural Law Constraintsfrom the
Fourteenth Amendment, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 187, 190 (1974) ("property" described as a "dynamic concept that can be changed as the public's
needs demand").
131. Reich, supra note 128.
132. Id. at 734-737.
133. Indeed, Reich recognized the connections between liberty and
property, and emphasized them:
During the industrial revolution, when property' was liberated
from feudal restraints, philosophers hailed property as the basis of
liberty, and argued that it must be free from the demands of government or society. But as private property grew, so did abuses
resulting from its use. In a crowded world, a man's use of his
property increasingly affected his neighbor, and one man's exercise of a right might seriously impair the rights of others. Property
became power over others; the farm landowner, the city landlord,
and the working man's boss were able to oppress their tenants or
employees. Great aggregations of property resulted in private control of entire industries and basic services capable of affecting a
whole area or even a nation. At the same time, much private property lost its individuality and in effect became socialized. Multiple
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can view this phenomenon as either primarily negative or primarily positive. It is primarily negative if one focuses on the
dramatically expanded role of government in creating constraints on our actions. It is primarily positive if one emphasizes the government's creation of new opportunities for individual choice and the government's offer of augmented
protections of both old and new arrays of alternative behavior. In either case the political and legal power from which
this liberty draws its substance have become the twin foci of
the modern regulated state.
Although there are many manifestations of this phenomenon in contemporary life, I shall mention only one. The
concentration of our sense of liberty in public institutions has
proceeded hand in hand with a general preoccupation with
the distribution of the economic pie rather than its expansion."" Two events seem to have occurred roughly simultaneously: one is the general success of capitalism, which has
made continued economic growth seem a theoretical rather
than a real issue; 35 the other is the breakdown and deemphasis of nonpublic social institutions. The result, as Gerald Sirkin argues, is a decreasing sense of individualism and
community and an increasing reliance upon centralized authority.1 3 ' Families, churches, and even the marketplace have
ownership of corporations helped to separate personality from
property, and property from power. When the corporations began
to stop competing, to merge, agree, and make mutual plans, they
became private governments. Finally, they sought the aid and
partnership of the state, and thus by their own volition became
part of public government.
These changes led to a movement for reform, which sought to
limit arbitrary power and protect the common man ....
* . . But the reform did not restore the individual to his domain.
What the corporation had taken from him, the reform simply
handed on the government. And government carried further the
powers formerly exercised by the corporation. Government as an
employer, or as a dispenser of wealth, has used the theory that it
was handing out gratuities to claim a managerial power as great as
that which the capitalists claimed. Moreover, the corporations allied themselves with, or actually took over, part of government's
system of power. Today it is the combined power of government
and the corporations that presses against the individual.
Id. at 772, 773.
134. See, e.g., Sirkin, supra note 56, at 183-85, 188.
135. Id. at 183-85.
136. Id. 184-85:
We are in the midst not merely of the movement from capitalism
to socialism . . . but of something more fundamental: the decline

19851

THE CONCEPT OF LIBERTY

lost their guiding influence precisely because they are decentralized. Hence the constraints which government imposes
are downgraded in importance. This is particularly true in
the economic arena, for restrictions here are not only diffuse,
but are usually felt only indirectly by individuals. Moreover,
in a generally successful regulated economy, the gains from
remaining an individualist and aloof from government entanglement are outweighed by the costs of doing so. 13 7 Hence, it
is no surprise at all that the concept of liberty has expanded
from its original individualist sense of simply an absence of
external constraints to the more complex modern demand
for access not only to the general economic success of the
society, but also to the political process that helps carve it up.
We, as a society, have developed new understandings concerning the definitional elements of, for example, "meaningfulness" and "harm to the liberty of others." But as our attention has turned from production of wealth to its
distribution, we have also developed a new sense of the "rule
of law" as a political ideal, a topic developed by Professor
Butler in his paper, and a discussion to which I defer.

of the individualistic ethos, which underlies capitalism, and the
rise of the authoritarian ethos, which underlies socialism.
137. Id. at 183.

